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Heien v. North Carolina 
13-604 
Ruling Below: State of North Carolina v. Nicholas Brad Heien, 749 S.E.2d 278 (Mem) (N.C. 
2013), cert granted, 134 S.Ct. 1872 (2014). 
Defendant was convicted, on his guilty plea, in the Superior Court, Surry County, of attempted 
trafficking in cocaine by transporting and by possession.  He appealed.  The Court of Appeals 
reversed.  State was granted petition for discretionary review.  The Supreme Court affirmed. 
Question Presented: Whether a police officer’s mistake of law can provide the individualized 
suspicion that the Fourth Amendment requires to justify a traffic stop. 
STATE of North Carolina 
v. 
Nicholas Brady HEIEN. 
Court of Appeals of North Carolina 
Decided on April 2, 2013 
[Excerpt; some footnotes and citations omitted.] 
McCULLOUGH, Judge. 
Nicholas Brady Heien (“defendant”) pled 
guilty to attempted trafficking in cocaine by 
transportation and possession in Surry 
County Superior Court in May 2010, 
preserving his right to seek review of the 
denial of his motion to suppress. The trial 
judge found defendant's prior record level to 
be Level I and sentenced defendant to ten to 
twelve months on each count with the 
sentence on the second count to be served 
consecutively to the first. Defendant 
appealed to this Court (“Heien I ”). That 
appeal resulted in our Court reversing 
defendant's conviction. In that case, this 
Court held that the traffic stop which led to 
defendant's arrest was not based on 
reasonable suspicion. The State successfully 
sought discretionary review of our decision. 
Our Supreme Court reversed and remanded 
to this Court so that the remaining issues 
raised by defendant could be addressed. This 
appeal addresses defendant's other 
challenges to the search which resulted in 
his conviction. 
The events which led to defendant's arrest 
and conviction originated with a traffic stop 
initiated by Sergeant M.M. Darisse, an 
officer with the Surry County Sheriff's 
Department. The facts regarding this stop 
are more fully set forth in our initial opinion 
concerning defendant's case  (Heien I ) and 
our Supreme Court's opinion which 
reversed Heien I. The facts will not be 
repeated in this opinion except to the extent 
necessary to support this Court's rationale. 
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In this Court's initial decision concerning 
defendant's appeal, we reversed defendant's 
conviction on the basis of the officer's stop, 
which the lower court found to be valid. 
There the trial court stated, “[Sergeant] 
Darisse had a reasonable and articulable 
suspicion that the ... vehicle and the driver 
were violating the laws of this State by 
operating a motor vehicle without a properly 
functioning brake light.” In Heien I, this 
Court found, after an extensive statutory 
analysis, that the statute dealing with brake 
lights as opposed to taillights, only required 
a vehicle to have one functioning brake 
light, and thus the officer's belief that 
defendant's vehicle must have two 
functioning brake lights was erroneous. That 
statute reads: 
(g) No person shall sell or operate on 
the highways of the State any motor 
vehicle, motorcycle or motor-driven 
cycle, manufactured after December 31, 
1955, unless it shall be equipped with 
a stop lamp on the rear of the vehicle. 
The stop lamp shall display a red or 
amber light visible from a distance of 
not less than 100 feet to the rear in 
normal sunlight, and shall be actuated 
upon application of the service (foot) 
brake. The stop lamp may be 
incorporated into a unit with one or 
more other rear lamps. 
The State appealed and our Supreme Court 
ruled that the officer's traffic stop was 
objectively reasonable. At the Supreme 
Court, the State accepted this Court's 
statutory interpretation in Heien I. Our 
Supreme Court stated: 
After considering the totality of the 
circumstances, we conclude that there 
was reasonable, articulable suspicion to 
conduct the traffic stop of the Escort in 
this case. We are not persuaded that, 
because Sergeant Darisse was mistaken 
about the requirements of our motor 
vehicle laws, the traffic stop was 
necessarily unconstitutional. After all, 
reasonable suspicion is a 
“commonsense, nontechnical 
conception[ ] ... on which reasonable 
and prudent men, not legal technicians, 
act,” and the Court of Appeals analyzed 
our General Statutes at length before 
reaching its conclusion that the officer's 
interpretation of the relevant motor 
vehicle laws was erroneous. After 
considering the totality of the 
circumstances, we hold that Sergeant 
Darisse's mistake of law was 
objectively reasonable and that he had 
reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle 
in which defendant was a passenger. 
Accordingly, we reverse the decision of 
the Court of Appeals and remand this 
case to that court for additional 
proceedings. 
The case has now been remanded to this 
Court to address defendant's remaining 
challenge to the events leading up to his 
arrest. In defendant's Motion To Suppress, 
defendant argues: 
10. No traffic charges were filed, and 
only a warning ticket was written. The 
continuation of the investigation after 
the motor vehicle stopped, including the 
questioning of the Defendant, was not 
based on a reasonable articulable 
suspicion that criminal activity had been 
committed or was being committed. 
11. The time that lapsed after Officer 
Darisse learned from the Department of 
Motor Vehicles computer that as to Mr. 
[V]asquez, “... everything was valid on 
the license and registration ...” and 
wrote the warning ticket, constituted an 
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unreasonably prolonged traffic stop and 
Defendant was unlawfully detained and 
his car unlawfully searched. 
12. Under the totality of the 
circumstances the officers had no just 
cause to detain the Defendant, question 
him, or search his vehicle without a 
warrant. 
13. The questioning and other 
investigation of the Defendant, the 
prolonged stop, and the search and 
seizure of Defendant and his property 
were in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment of the United States 
Constitution as the same is made 
applicable to the states, and are in 
violation of Article I, Sections 
19 and 20 of the Constitution of the 
State of North Carolina. 
I. SCOPE OF THE VEHICLE SEARCH 
14. The alleged controlled substance 
was found inside a sandwich bag which 
was inside a paper towel which was 
inside a white grocery bag which was 
inside the side compartment of a duffle 
bag which was inside the vehicle. 
Neither Officer Darisse nor Officer 
Ward advised the Defendant that they 
were going to search his car for 
narcotics before he gave verbal consent. 
The Defendant was entitled to know the 
object of their search prior to giving 
consent. Had he known, he would have 
had the opportunity to place explicit 
limitations on the search. The failure of 
the officers to explain the object of the 
search violates Defendant's right to be 
free from unreasonable searches under 
the Fourth Amendment to the [United] 
States Constitution and Articles 19 and 
20 of the Constitution of North 
Carolina, and evidence of items found 
inside the duffle bag and elsewhere 
inside the vehicle should be suppressed. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
In reviewing a trial court's order concerning 
a motion to suppress, this Court utilizes the 
following test: 
Generally, an appellate court's review of 
a trial court's order on a motion to 
suppress “is strictly limited to a 
determination of whether its findings 
are supported by competent evidence, 
and in turn, whether the findings 
support the trial court's ultimate 
conclusion.” Where, however, the trial 
court's findings of fact are not 
challenged on appeal, they are deemed 
to be supported by competent evidence 
and are binding on appeal. 
I. Length of Stop 
Defendant argues that the traffic stop was 
unduly prolonged in his motion. Our 
analysis begins with the pertinent trial 
court's findings of fact: 
8) Darisse upon instigating his blue 
lights, observed a head “pop up” out of 
the back seat of the subject vehicle and 
then disappear. 
9) Darisse upon approaching the vehicle 
observed the defendant lying in the 
back seat of the vehicle. 
10) Darisse observed the defendant 
lying in the back seat underneath a 
blanket. Darisse informed the driver of 
the vehicle that he was being stopped 
for a non-functioning brake light and 
asked the driver to step out to the rear of 
the vehicle. The driver complied. 
Darisse engaged in a brief conversation 
with the driver asking the driver if 
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anything was wrong with the person in 
the back seat, from where the driver 
began travelling and his ultimate 
destination. The Driver informed 
Darisse that the defendant was tired and 
the pair were going to West Virginia. 
The driver was informed that the officer 
intended to issue him a warning citation 
so long as long documentation provided 
to Darisse was valid. Darisse took the 
driver's license and registration then 
returned to his vehicle. Darisse formed 
the opinion that the driver appeared 
nervous to him as he made poor eye 
contact and he was continuously placing 
his hair in a ponytail and then removing 
his hair from a ponytail. Defendant 
continued to lie in the back of the 
vehicle and did so through the entire 
stop until he was later approached by 
Darisse. 
11) Officer Ward arrived at the scene of 
the stop. Ward was informed by Darisse 
that a subject was lying in the back of 
the vehicle underneath a blanket. Ward 
went to the vehicle and asked defendant 
for his driver's license in order to 
determine his identity and check for 
outstanding warrants. The defendant 
complied and gave his driver's license 
to Ward without getting up from his 
position. 
12) The driver continued to stand 
between Darisse's patrol car and the 
subject car as Ward asked for the 
defendant's driver's license. 
13) The interaction between Ward and 
the defendant occurred in 
approximately one to two minutes. 
14) The stop of the subject vehicle was 
initiated at approximately 7:55:40 a.m. 
15) Darisse re-approached the driver 
and returned his driver's license and any 
other identifying documents he had 
received and gave the driver a warning 
citation. Darisse then asked the driver if 
he would be willing to answer some 
questions. The driver indicated by 
nodding his head that he had no 
objection to answering questions and 
stated he would answer questions. 
Darisse's tone and manner with the 
driver of the vehicle was polite, non-
confrontational and conversational. 
16) The driver denied any type of 
contraband in the car. 
17) The driver denied guns or large 
sums of cash in the car. 
18) This conversation occurred within a 
period of a minute to two minutes. 
19) Darisse then asked for permission to 
search the vehicle. The driver did not 
object to searching the vehicle, but 
informed Darisse that the vehicle was 
the defendant's, and Darisse should 
make the request of the 
defendant. Darisse approached the 
defendant who was still lying in the 
back of the vehicle and asked for 
permission to search the vehicle. The 
defendant informed Darisse that he had 
no objection to the vehicle being 
searched, although the officers might 
have a problem because the inside of 
the vehicle was messy. 
20) The tone and manner of Darisse 
when asking for permission to search 
the vehicle with the defendant was 
conversational, non-confrontational and 
polite. 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution as well as Article I, Section 20 
of the North Carolina Constitution guarantee 
the right of people to be secure in their 
person and property, and free from 
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unreasonable searches. A traffic stop is 
permitted if an officer has a reasonable 
articulable suspicion that there is criminal 
activity afoot or when a motorist commits a 
violation in his or her presence. In this case 
our Supreme Court has established that the 
traffic stop was permissible. The temporary 
detention of a motorist during a valid traffic 
stop is recognized as a seizure, but a 
permissible one, as it is considered 
reasonable. While it is recognized that the 
motorist is seized for constitutional 
purposes, roadside questioning during the 
encounter does not trigger the need 
for Miranda warnings. Once the purpose of 
the stop has been addressed, there must be 
grounds which provide a reasonable and 
articulable suspicion in order to justify 
further delay. Generally, the return of the 
driver's license or other documents to those 
who have been detained indicates the 
investigatory detention has ended. The fact 
that the documents have been returned does 
not mean that the officer loses all right to 
communicate with the motorist. Thus, non-
coercive conversation is still permitted. An 
officer may ask questions or request consent 
to search so long as the individual freely and 
voluntarily consents to answer questions or 
to allow his or her property to be searched. 
So long as an individual is aware that he is 
free to leave or free to refuse to answer 
questions, there is no bright-line rule 
requiring police to refrain from requesting 
consent to speak to an individual or request 
consent to search his or her person or 
property. 
Here, the return of documentation would 
render the encounter between defendant and 
the officers consensual so long as a 
reasonable person would believe he was free 
to leave or refuse the request. The trial court 
found the encounter became consensual. The 
testimony and exhibits at the suppression 
hearing tend to support the trial court's 
findings of fact and conclusions of law; thus, 
we are required to uphold its determination 
that the defendant freely consented to the 
search as a reasonable person in his position 
would not feel coerced under similar 
circumstances. 
Here the encounter was not unduly 
prolonged. The trial court found that the 
traffic stop was initiated at 7:55:40 a.m. and 
that defendant gave his consent to search at 
8:08 a.m. During that time the two officers, 
Ward and Darisse, had discussed the 
malfunctioning brake light with the driver, 
had discovered that the two claimed to be 
going to different destinations (West 
Virginia or Kentucky), and had observed 
that defendant engaged in rather bizarre 
behavior by lying down on the backseat 
under a blanket, even when approached by 
Officer Ward who requested his driver's 
license. After each person's name was 
checked for warrants, their licenses were 
returned. Defendant had his license back 
before the request to search was made. The 
trial court found that the officer's tone and 
manner were conversational and non-
confrontational. Both defendant and the 
driver were unrestrained during this 
encounter, no guns were drawn and neither 
individual was searched before the request 
to search the vehicle was made. 
Based on this record we believe the trial 
court was entitled to conclude that defendant 
was aware that the purpose of the initial stop 
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had been concluded and that further 
conversation was consensual. The dissent 
maintains that there is insufficient evidence 
in the record to sustain this conclusion, but 
there is no requirement that a defendant be 
explicitly informed of his right to refuse a 
request to search. 
The dissent seems to argue that this 
defendant was merely a passenger and, as 
such, would not feel free to leave or deny 
consent since the record does not establish 
that defendant knew the driver Vasquez had 
received his license and a warning ticket had 
been issued. This argument ignores the fact 
that defendant was not a mere passenger, but 
was the owner. It is uncontroverted that 
defendant's driver's license had been 
returned to him prior to the consent to search 
request. We believe that the trial court's 
conclusion that defendant consented to this 
search is reasonable and should be upheld, 
as we further believe a reasonable motorist 
or vehicle owner would understand that with 
the return of his license or other documents, 
the purpose of the initial stop had been 
accomplished and he was free to leave, was 
free to refuse to discuss matters further, and 
was free to refuse to allow a search. 
II. Scope of Search 
In his motion to suppress, defendant also 
asserts that the officer should have informed 
defendant that he was searching for 
narcotics so that defendant could have 
issued some limiting instructions. We find 
this argument unpersuasive. Just as there is 
no requirement for an officer to explicitly 
inform defendant of his right to refuse a 
search, there is no requirement that an 
officer inform defendant of what he is 
searching for. We believe that any 
reasonable person would understand the 
officer was searching for weapons, cash or 
contraband. The driver, Vasquez, was asked 
if any of those items were in the car. 
Additionally, defendant informed Darisse 
that it might be difficult to search the vehicle 
as it was messy. We also believe both the 
driver and defendant were aware that the 
search would be somewhat detailed as the 
driver was asked to identify any objects that 
did not belong to him. Sergeant Darisse 
evidently began to search the vehicle and 
immediately found a bag of marijuana under 
the front seat and marijuana seeds in the 
ashtray. At this point, the officers had 
probable cause to search the entire vehicle 
as well as probable cause to arrest both the 
driver and defendant. The fact that 
defendant may have wished to limit the 
search became irrelevant. 
CONCLUSION 
In the case at bar, defendant's automobile 
which was being driven by another 
individual, was properly stopped by officers 
of the Surry County Sheriff's Department 
while on routine traffic patrol. After the 
officer had issued a warning ticket for a 
nonfunctioning brake light and both persons 
had their driver's licenses returned, a request 
to search the vehicle was made. We 
conclude that on the record before the trial 
court there was ample evidence that a 
reasonable person would understand he was 
free to leave or refuse to consent to the 
request. The trial court concluded defendant 
consented to the search and the trial court's 
conclusion is supported by the evidence 
presented at the suppression hearing. Shortly 
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after the search was initiated, probable cause 
to conduct a more detailed search and to 
arrest the occupants was obtained. We thus 
will uphold the trial court's conclusion that 
this was a consensual encounter and affirm 
its denial of defendant's Motion To 
Suppress. 
Affirmed. 
Judge ERVIN concurs. 
Judge McGEE dissents with a separate 
opinion. 
McGEE, Judge. 
I respectfully dissent from the majority's 
conclusion that Defendant “freely 
consented” to the search of his vehicle, since 
that conclusion is contrary to binding 
precedent of our Court in State v. Jackson. 
“Where a panel of the Court of Appeals has 
decided the same issue, albeit in a different 
case, a subsequent panel of the same court is 
bound by that precedent, unless it has been 
overturned by a higher court.” 
A crucial fact, found by the trial court, is 
that Defendant remained lying on the back 
seat inside his vehicle while officers 
questioned the driver, who stood outside 
Defendant's vehicle between an officer's 
patrol car and Defendant's vehicle. A crucial 
fact, not found by the trial court, is that 
Defendant knew the traffic stop was over 
when he consented to the search. 
“When a police officer makes a traffic stop, 
the driver of the car is seized within the 
meaning of the Fourth Amendment.... [A] 
passenger is seized as well and so may 
challenge the constitutionality of the stop.” 
“Once the original purpose of the stop has 
been addressed, in order to justify further 
delay, there must be grounds which provide 
the detaining officer with additional 
reasonable and articulable suspicion or the 
encounter must have become consensual.” 
First, we determine at what point the 
original purpose of the stop had been 
addressed by the officers. In Jackson, the 
officer stopped the vehicle on suspicion the 
driver was operating the vehicle without a 
license. This Court concluded the detention 
was limited to “confirming or dispelling [the 
officer's] suspicion that [the driver] was 
operating his vehicle without a license.” The 
officer, however, continued the 
interrogation.  
Such interrogation was indeed an 
extension of the detention beyond the 
scope of the original traffic stop as the 
interrogation was not necessary to 
confirm or dispel [the officer's] 
suspicion that [the driver] was operating 
without a valid driver's license and it 
occurred after [the officer's] suspicion 
that [the driver] was operating without a 
license had already been dispelled. 
In this case, the original purpose of the stop 
was the brake light. The detention was 
limited to confirming or dispelling the 
suspicion that the brake light did not 
function. However, after the citation, an 
officer asked Defendant for consent to 
search. The request for Defendant's consent 
was not necessary to confirm or dispel 
suspicions regarding the brake light. The 
request to search extended the detention 
beyond the scope of the original traffic stop. 
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Second, we decide whether the delay was 
justified by determining if (1) the encounter 
between Defendant and the officers became 
consensual or (2) there were grounds for a 
reasonable and articulable suspicion. The 
trial court concluded “the encounter between 
the officers, [D]efendant and the driver, 
became a consensual encounter at the time 
the driver voluntarily agreed to answer 
questions, after the warning citation was 
delivered to the driver and both driver and 
[D]efendant had all documents returned.” 
“The test for determining whether a seizure 
has occurred is whether under the totality of 
the circumstances a reasonable person 
would feel that he was not free to decline the 
officers' request or otherwise terminate the 
encounter.” “[T]he return of documentation 
would render a subsequent encounter 
consensual only if a reasonable person under 
the circumstances would believe he was free 
to leave or disregard the officer's request for 
information.” The person at issue is this case 
is Defendant, not the driver. The trial court 
and the majority conflate the perspectives of 
the driver and Defendant, resulting in the 
use of an erroneous standard. 
“[A] passenger in a car that has been 
stopped by a law enforcement officer is still 
seized when the stop is extended.” “A 
passenger would not feel any freer to leave 
when the stop is lawfully or unlawfully 
extended, especially ... where the officer was 
questioning the driver away from the vehicle 
while the passengers waited in the vehicle.”  
No findings show or suggest Defendant was 
aware that an officer had issued a citation or 
that the officers had completed the 
investigation of the brake lights. In fact, the 
trial court found that Defendant remained in 
the back seat, inside the vehicle. A 
reasonable person under the same 
circumstances would not believe he was free 
to leave because, from Defendant's 
perspective inside the vehicle, the stop 
continued while the driver was questioned 
outside. Without a finding that Defendant 
was privy to the same information as the 
driver, this Court does not impute the 
driver's knowledge to Defendant. 
Because Defendant consented during an 
unlawful seizure of his person, the consent 
was ineffective to justify the search. 
The majority also considers the length of the 
delay, without holding it to be de 
minimis. To the extent the majority 
considers the delay's length, I must dissent 
because the issue is not preserved. Although 
the State argues on appeal that (1) the delay 
was de minimis and (2) reasonable 
articulable suspicion existed to justify the 
delay, the State did not make such 
arguments at trial, and the trial court made 
no ruling on either issue. 
An appellee may list proposed issues on 
appeal “based on any action or omission of 
the trial court that was properly preserved 
for appellate review and that deprived the 
appellee of an alternative basis in law for 
supporting the judgment, order, or other 
determination from which appeal has been 
taken.” “In order to preserve an issue for 
appellate review, a party must have 
presented to the trial court a timely request, 
objection, or motion, stating the specific 
grounds for the ruling the party desired the 
court to make if the specific grounds were 
not apparent from the context.” These 
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alternative bases are not preserved for our 
review. 
The majority analyzes a second issue, scope 
of the search, which Defendant did not argue 
to this Court. Because this issue regarding 
the scope of the search is not before us, I 
dissent from the majority as to its conclusion 
on that issue as well. 
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“U.S. Supreme Court Considers Whether the Fourth Amendment Allows 
Reasonable Mistakes of Substantive Law” 
Verdict 
Sherry F. Colb 
April 30, 2014 
 
Last week, the U.S. Supreme Court granted 
certiorari in the case of Heien v. North 
Carolina. Heien raises the issue of whether a 
stop is lawful, for Fourth Amendment 
purposes, when the basis for the stop is the 
officer’s having seen the driver do 
something lawful that the officer reasonably 
but mistakenly believes violates state law. 
Described differently, the question is 
whether the Fourth Amendment protects 
against stops by a police officer who acts on 
the basis of a reasonable but erroneous 
interpretation of state law. Different courts 
of appeals have arrived at distinct 
conclusions on this issue, so the Court will 
be resolving a circuit split in answering what 
turns out to be a difficult Fourth 
Amendment question. 
Facts of Heien 
In Heien, a police officer pulled over a 
vehicle in which the right rear brake light 
initially failed to illuminate when the driver 
engaged the brakes. The officer interpreted 
the existing traffic law to prohibit driving a 
car with one non-functioning brake light. 
The state court of appeals later determined, 
however, that the traffic law actually 
requires only one working brake light and 
that the officer who stopped the car 
therefore had no valid reason for the stop. 
This interpretation conflicted with what 
others had reasonably understood to be the 
meaning of the statute. 
Had the driver of Nicholas Brady Heien’s 
car been charged with a traffic violation, the 
case would have been dismissed, under the 
court of appeals’ interpretation of the 
statute. One cannot, after all, be guilty of 
violating a legal requirement that does not 
exist. After pulling over the driver, however, 
the officer in the case asked for and received 
consent from both driver and passenger 
(Heien) to search the vehicle, and the 
subsequent search turned up cocaine. Heien 
was then arrested and charged with 
trafficking in cocaine, on the basis of the 
evidence found during the search of the 
vehicle. 
Given the state court of appeals’ 
interpretation of the statute, the defendant 
argued that the evidence at issue should 
have been suppressed as the fruit of an 
unlawful stop. What made the stop 
unlawful? The fact that it happened without 
any reasonable suspicion that something 
unlawful had occurred or was about to 
occur, the standard for validating a brief 
stop, under the Supreme Court’s decision 
in Terry v. Ohio. 
The Meaning of “Reasonable Seizures” 
Under the Fourth Amendment 
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The Fourth Amendment protects people’s 
right to be secure against “unreasonable . . . 
seizures.” Among other things, this gives 
people a right to liberty from detention by 
the government (i.e., liberty from “seizures 
of the person”) absent a valid basis for their 
detention. For police to lawfully conduct a 
brief stop of a suspect, the Supreme Court 
has held that they must have a “reasonable 
suspicion” that unlawful activity is in 
progress or has been committed. 
Reasonable suspicion is a less rigorous 
standard than what is needed for an arrest, 
which generally requires “probable cause” 
to believe that a crime has taken place. 
While more lenient than probable cause, 
however, “reasonable suspicion” still 
demands that police have some factual basis 
for suspecting a violation of the law before 
detaining an otherwise free person, even for 
a short time. 
Within this legal framework, a police officer 
might stop a driver who is weaving from 
side to side in traffic. In this situation, police 
could reasonably suspect that the driver is 
intoxicated, and driving while intoxicated is 
against the law. It could turn out that the 
driver is not intoxicated but was weaving 
because she is a relatively new driver. 
Still, the stop would be legally valid, and if 
the police saw narcotics in plain view during 
the stop, those drugs would accordingly be 
admissible against the driver in a subsequent 
drug-related criminal prosecution. Police, in 
other words, can be mistaken in their 
suspicions without thereby violating the 
Fourth Amendment requirement that they 
act “reasonably.” 
In Heien’s case, the problem is that what the 
police reasonably suspected (driving with a 
broken brake light) turned out to be lawful 
activity, under the state court of appeals’ 
interpretation of the law at issue. To 
“reasonably suspect” lawful activity does 
not ordinarily justify a seizure, so the police 
in this case might have violated the Fourth 
Amendment. If so, then the evidence that 
turned up during a consent search on the 
heels of the stop might represent “fruit of the 
poisonous tree,” inadmissible against Heien 
in his prosecution for cocaine trafficking. 
An Easy Case 
Consider what an easy case of police error 
would look like. Assume that the law 
permits people to play music while they 
drive. A police officer is driving on the 
highway and hears the sounds of radio 
music (The Grateful Dead) emerging from a 
car driven by John Doe. The officer now has 
“reasonable suspicion” to believe that the 
driver is playing music in his vehicle while 
driving. Absent some other objectively 
reasonable basis for pulling over John Doe, 
however, the police officer in this situation 
may not stop Mr. Doe without violating the 
Fourth Amendment. This is true, moreover, 
even if the officer happens to believe 
(without a good reason) that it is illegal to 
play music while driving. 
Take a different scenario. Now the officer 
believes that John Doe is committing an 
actual offense, such as driving while 
intoxicated, but the officer lacks any 
adequate factual grounds for that belief. 
Perhaps the officer again hears Grateful 
Dead music coming out of the car. The 
officer (unreasonably) concludes that 
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listening to the Grateful Dead provides 
strong evidence of intoxication. If the officer 
pulls over Mr. Doe on the basis of this 
conclusion, then—absent some 
independently valid basis for the stop—she 
will be violating the Fourth Amendment. 
For a stop to comply with the Fourth 
Amendment, then, requires both that the 
facts support a conclusion that the person to 
be stopped is doing or has done some act 
(X) and that X be illegal. But what happens 
when X is legal and the officer reasonably 
(though incorrectly) believes that X is 
illegal? That is the question presented by 
this case. 
In an important sense, the two hypothetical 
scenarios above, in both of which the officer 
lacks reasonable suspicion of criminal 
activity, are essentially the same. Having 
“reasonable suspicion” to believe that a 
driver is doing something legal is the same 
thing as having “no reasonable suspicion” to 
believe that the driver is doing something 
illegal. In these two scenarios, hearing 
Grateful Dead music coming from the 
vehicle plays both roles—it is good evidence 
that the driver is listening to music while 
driving (which is legal), and it is inadequate 
evidence that the driver is driving while 
intoxicated (which is illegal). Any time 
police lack reasonable suspicion to justify a 
stop, it will always be the case that they 
simultaneously (1) have a factual basis for 
believing that the driver is doing something 
lawful (e.g., driving at the speed limit), and 
(2) lack a factual basis for believing that the 
driver is doing something unlawful. 
Reasonable but Mistaken Factual Beliefs 
Fourth Amendment doctrine has always and 
necessarily tolerated errors by police 
officers. Police, like other humans, are 
imperfect and therefore will sometimes 
carry out valid searches or seizures that turn 
up nothing, particularly given the relatively 
permissive standards of “probable cause” 
and “reasonable suspicion” that authorize 
searches and seizures. 
Police might, for example, have probable 
cause to believe that Jane Roe robbed a bank 
and that she is hiding the fruits of that crime 
in her knapsack. (Say an eyewitness to the 
robbery identified Jane in error.) In such a 
case, police will be able to obtain a warrant 
to arrest Jane in her home and to seize and 
search Jane’s knapsack for the proceeds of 
the robbery. 
The fact that Jane is actually innocent of the 
robbery does not in any way negate the 
“reasonableness” of what the police do. The 
Fourth Amendment does not require that 
police be factually correct in their suspicions 
every time they carry out a search or seizure. 
It requires only that police always behave 
reasonably when they carry out searches or 
seizures. 
In what contexts are errors acceptable? 
Generally, “reasonable” police errors have 
concerned the facts. As in the description 
above, police may have gathered sufficient 
evidence (through witnesses or 
observations) to warrant the conclusion that 
a particular person committed a crime and/or 
that evidence of crime may be found in a 
particular location. If so, and if police obtain 
a warrant (in those cases in which a warrant 
is required), then they have complied with 
the dictates of the Fourth Amendment, even 
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if it turns out that they were mistaken about 
the facts and that the suspect at issue is 
innocent and/or the location in question does 
not contain the predicted evidence. 
Reasonable Legal Errors 
On the North Carolina Supreme Court’s 
approach, police who briefly stop a suspect 
comply with the Fourth Amendment so long 
as they reasonably—even if mistakenly—
believe that what they witnessed evidences 
the suspect’s having violated an actual law. 
In the U.S. Supreme Court’s case law, 
however, the reasonable errors that the 
Court finds to have complied with the 
Fourth Amendment have typically been 
errors of fact and not of law. In this sense, 
the officer who “reasonably believes” that 
driving with music on is illegal is in 
uncharted territory, as is the officer who 
erroneously but reasonably believes that 
driving with only one working brake light is 
illegal. 
One could argue, as the North Carolina 
Supreme Court maintains, that being 
reasonably mistaken about the law is really 
no different from being reasonably mistaken 
about the facts. When police believe, with 
good reason, that the law has been violated, 
then they may act—whether their mistake 
turns out to be one of law or one of fact. As 
we saw above, for example, an officer who 
stops someone playing music in his car 
because the officer believes that playing 
music is illegal is making the same sort of 
mistake as the officer who stops someone 
playing music in his car because the officer 
believes that playing (Grateful Dead) music 
evidences intoxication. 
To support this position, the North Carolina 
Supreme Court cites a U.S. Supreme Court 
case that approves an arrest for violating an 
ordinance that was subsequently declared 
unconstitutional. In Michigan v. DeFillippo, 
police arrested a man for violating an 
ordinance, and the (otherwise lawful) search 
incident to arrest that followed turned up 
evidence of a drug offense, for which the 
man was charged. On appeal, the Michigan 
Court of Appeals held that the ordinance 
that the man had violated was 
unconstitutionally vague. Nonetheless, the 
U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the arrest was 
valid, because it was made on the basis of 
“good faith” reliance on a presumptively 
valid statute. This case might seem 
effectively to dispose of Heien, since the 
officer in Heien, like the police 
in DeFillippo, reasonably relied on what 
turned out to have been an incorrect but 
reasonable reading of the law. 
Good Faith 
The problem with this equation of factual 
and legal errors is that ever since 1984, 
when police have made reasonable legal 
errors rather than reasonable factual errors, 
the U.S. Supreme Court has ruled on the 
admission of resulting evidence on the basis 
of the “good faith” exception to the Fourth 
Amendment exclusionary rule rather than 
finding actual compliance with the Fourth 
Amendment. Because DeFillippo was 
decided before the good faith doctrine was 
born, its applicability to the scenario in 
Heien might be supplanted by the more 
recent, more properly applicable good faith 
doctrine. The reasoning in DeFillippo, 
moreover, may be harmonized with that 
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underlying the good faith doctrine. After all, 
although the Court in DeFillippo relied on 
the Fourth Amendment itself rather than on 
a good faith exception to exclusion, it 
expressly used the phrase “good faith,” 
which could help link that decision with the 
later-developed good faith doctrine. 
The “Good Faith” Exception to Exclusion 
In many situations, police “reasonably” act 
in violation of the Fourth Amendment, 
which the Court confusingly calls “good 
faith,” though it refers to objectively 
reasonable reliance rather than to 
subjectively good intentions (the ordinary 
meaning of “good faith”). In such situations, 
the Court has recognized an exception to the 
Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule and 
accordingly permits the admission of any 
resulting evidence at the suspect’s 
subsequent criminal trial, even though there 
might have been a Fourth Amendment 
violation. 
The Court first announced the “good faith” 
exception to exclusion in United States v. 
Leon. The Court held that if it is reasonable 
to rely on what turns out later to have been a 
defective warrant, then police reliance on 
that warrant, though in violation of the 
Fourth Amendment, will nonetheless yield 
admissible evidence. This can occur if 
police have assembled factual evidence that 
they “reasonably” believe satisfies the legal 
probable cause standard, though the 
evidence they have assembled actually falls 
short of that standard, according to a later 
reviewing court. In this circumstance, the 
fact that there is a reasonable basis for 
believing in the validity of the warrant, 
coupled with police diligence in having 
sought a warrant and thereby observed the 
protective safeguard entailed in consulting a 
neutral magistrate, sufficiently redeems their 
conduct to permit the introduction of any 
resulting evidence. 
A “good faith” error in this sort of case is 
best characterized as an error of law: though 
police have reason to think that what they 
have observed and gathered is sufficient to 
satisfy the legal standard of “probable 
cause,” it actually is not. Yet the evidence 
comes in. 
A few years later, in Illinois v. Krull, the 
Court extended the “good faith” exception to 
cover cases in which police carry out a 
search or seizure pursuant to the authority of 
a statute that, a court later determines, 
violates the Fourth 
Amendment. Krull means that if a police 
officer “reasonably” searches or seizes on 
the basis of a statute that turns out to have 
authorized unconstitutional searches or 
seizures, the evidence that an officer finds as 
a result of the constitutional violation is 
nonetheless admissible in evidence at the 
suspect’s subsequent criminal trial. As 
in Leon, the sort of officer error at issue 
in Krull is best characterized as a legal error, 
because it stems from an erroneous 
understanding of what the U.S. Constitution 
has to say about a statute that authorizes 
searches or seizures. Yet the evidence comes 
in, despite a Fourth Amendment violation. 
In Arizona v. Evans in 1995 and Herring v. 
United States in 2009, the Supreme Court 
held that if police carry out an arrest based 
on a warrant in whose existence they 
reasonably but mistakenly believe, then 
evidence found as a result of the arrest is 
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also admissible under the “good faith” 
exception to the exclusionary rule. These 
cases involved computer databases that 
contained erroneous information indicating 
that there were warrants outstanding for the 
arrests of the respective suspects. As in the 
other good faith cases discussed here, the 
best account of these cases is that they 
involved errors of law. The police were in 
error about the existence of legal 
authorization from a magistrate for a seizure 
of the person (an arrest), but the evidence 
was admissible anyway. 
Most recently, the Court held, in Davis v. 
United States, that an unconstitutional 
search of a vehicle incident to arrest, if 
conducted in objectively reasonable reliance 
on binding appellate precedent holding that 
the Fourth Amendment authorizes such 
searches, does not trigger application of the 
exclusionary rule. In the case in question, 
there was binding appellate precedent 
holding that the Fourth Amendment always 
permits the search of a vehicle, incident to 
an arrest of an occupant of the vehicle, even 
after the arrestee has been secured and 
cannot reach the vehicle. This turned out to 
be erroneous, under a U.S. Supreme Court 
case, Arizona v. Gant, which came down 
after the search took place but before 
Davis’s conviction became final. 
Nonetheless, it was “reasonable” for police, 
at the time of the search, to rely on binding 
appellate precedent going the other way. 
In Heien, as in Davis, a police officer made 
a decision to carry out a search or seizure on 
the basis of a reasonable assumption that the 
law allowed it, but a later, unforeseeable 
judicial decision ruled that the law in fact 
rejected it. In Davis, the error concerned an 
interpretation of the Fourth Amendment 
itself, while in Heien, the error concerned an 
interpretation of the substantive traffic law. 
Yet in both cases, an officer acted on the 
basis of an erroneous but reasonable 
understanding of the governing law. It 
seems accordingly likely that the Supreme 
Court will see fit to apply its good faith 
exception to the exclusionary rule in this 
case rather than holding that police comply 
with the Fourth Amendment when they stop 
someone for violating a law that does not 
exist (but that the officer reasonably believes 
does exist). 
The Impact of Ruling on the Basis of 
Good Faith 
For purposes of deciding whether evidence 
resulting from the stop in Heien was 
admissible, it does not matter very much 
whether the Supreme Court decides that the 
search was reasonable (based on a 
reasonable mistake of law) or that even if 
the search was unreasonable, the error was 
made in good faith (because one could have 
reasonably interpreted the statute to prohibit 
driving with one broken brake light). Either 
way, the evidence comes in. 
Nonetheless, the outcome I predict—that the 
Court will find a good faith exception for 
errors of law—will provide an opportunity 
for the current Court to marginalize the 
exclusionary rule again, as it has done many 
times before. The Court will likely repeat its 
views that (1) the Fourth Amendment does 
not require exclusion and that (2) exclusion 
of evidence is a costly measure that should 
be pursued only as a matter of last resort. 
When a police officer reasonably but 
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erroneously interprets the traffic law to 
prohibit what a driver is doing, then—
whether or not the officer violates the Fourth 
Amendment in doing so—there is no good 
reason to suppress reliable, probative 
evidence where the police did nothing 
deliberate, reckless, or even negligent, in 
acting as they did. 
Deciding the case in this fashion, as I expect 
the Court will do, will have the benefit of 
avoiding the possibility of narrowing the 
scope of the Fourth Amendment itself. 
Rather than saying expressly that a police 
officer may lawfully stop someone for 
committing a nonexistent traffic offense, the 
Court would be limiting its discussion to the 
question of remedy and leaving the 
substantive issue open. 
On the other hand, deciding the case in this 
fashion will also mean one more context in 
which no deterrent exists for Fourth 
Amendment violations. Certainly no one 
will be able to bring a lawsuit against a 
police officer (or a department) for stopping 
people who violate what the officer (or 
department) “reasonably” believes is the 
law. Thus without the exclusionary rule, 
where there is any margin for error, there is 
every incentive for police to “reasonably” 
interpret the law to prohibit what they want 
it to prohibit, rather than erring on the side 
of caution. Ironically, then, the Court’s 
continuing reliance on the “good faith” 
doctrine to avoid explicitly addressing 
Fourth Amendment questions might in 
reality serve to narrow the scope of the 
Fourth Amendment’s protections as 
effectively as a decision to do so expressly 
would have done. 
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“Can a Police Officer Lawfully Pull Over a Car for a Traffic Violation Based 
on an Erroneous Understanding of the Traffic Laws?” 
The Volokh Conspiracy 
Orin Kerr 
December 21, 2012 
 
Under Whren v. United States, the police 
can pull over a car based on probable cause 
to believe a traffic violation has occurred. 
Any civil traffic violation counts: If you’re 
driving at 36mph in a 35 mph zone, you can 
be lawfully pulled over. But what if the 
officer pulls over a car based on his belief 
that a violation has occurred, and it turns out 
that the officer has the law wrong? That is, 
what if you’re not violating the law, and the 
officer mistakenly thinks you are? And 
here’s where it gets interesting: What if the 
officer’s mistake about the law is a 
reasonable one? 
Lower courts are deeply divided on the 
question, and the Supreme Court of North 
Carolina just entered the fray with State v. 
Heien, ruling by a vote of 4-3 that the Fourth 
Amendment permits an officer to execute a 
seizure based on a reasonable mistake of 
law. The facts of Heien are the best possible 
facts for the government in a case like this. 
An officer spotted a car with a broken rear 
right brake light. The officer pulled over the 
car, and the traffic stop eventually led to the 
discovery of drugs in the car. The defendant 
was convicted, and on appeal persuaded the 
North Carolina Court of Appeals to adopt a 
rather surprising interpretation of the traffic 
laws.  
According to a long statutory analysis from 
the North Carolina Court of Appeals, 
interpreting several archaic sections of the 
traffic code, it was actually legal to have one 
broken brake light as long as the other brake 
light functioned properly. The state 
government saw the opportunity: It accepted 
this interpretation of the statutes, and it 
petitioned the North Carolina Supreme 
Court only on the Fourth Amendment 
question of whether the stop was 
constitutionally reasonable even though it 
turned out that the officer’s belief that a 
broken tail light was unlawful was not 
correct. That is, did pulling over the car with 
a broken tail light violate the Fourth 
Amendment? 
A divided North Carolina Supreme Court 
ruled that the stop was constitutionally 
reasonable. The officer had a reasonable 
belief as to what the traffic laws meant, the 
majority reasoned, and he acted reasonably. 
Because the Fourth Amendment requires 
reasonableness, this is all the Fourth 
Amendment requires and the resulting stop 
was constitutional. The dissent agrees that 
the officer acted reasonably in a generic 
sense, but it argues that we would not want 
to systemically allow stops of people who 
are not breaking the law at all based on 
erroneous officer understandings of what the 
law is. The dissent also points out that this is 
like an exclusionary rule case in disguise: 
The majority’s reasoning is akin to saying 
that there is a good faith exception at the 
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remedies stage, the kind of thinking that 
should not infuse the court’s reasoning at the 
initial stage of whether a constitutional 
violation occurred. 
This is a very interesting Fourth Amendment 
issue — and not an easy one, at least to me. 
At first blush, my sympathies tend to be 
with the defense here. That’s true for three 
reasons, which I’ll concede may be a bit 
idiosyncratic. First, I’ve always thought that 
the unstated rationale of why the courts 
allow a traffic stop for a non-criminal 
violation must be to enforce the traffic laws 
— it’s a sort of regulatory rationale which 
acts as an exception to the usual rule that 
cause of criminality is required to make a 
stop. Given that regulatory purpose, it seems 
sensible that the scope of the police power is 
based on what that law actually prohibits, 
not what an officer mistakenly thinks it 
prohibits. And it doesn’t help that the police 
tend to have tremendous influence on their 
state traffic laws: As a practical matter, if an 
officer can’t find a traffic violation to stop a 
car, he isn’t trying very hard. And if a court 
identifies a problem with the traffic laws as 
the lower court did here, the legislature is 
likely to fix it in the government’s favor 
pronto. Given that, I’m not sure why we 
would need a doctrine that makes room for 
officer errors of law. 
Second, as a Criminal Law professor, I can’t 
help but approach the question by reference 
to the doctrine of mistake of law in criminal 
law. When a citizen makes a reasonable 
mistake of law as to what is criminal, the 
general rule is that ignorance of the law is 
no excuse. If a citizen reads the law and 
perfectly reasonably thinks his conduct is 
lawful, only to have a court take a surprising 
reading of the criminal law and say he is 
guilty, the courts say “enjoy your time in 
prison, Mr. Marrero.” And they say that for 
a good reason. Although it seems harsh in 
rare cases where the law is construed in a 
surprising way, we generally want citizens 
to approach the law with care and have an 
incentive to learn about it. Looking beyond 
that one case, it’s very hard to administer 
routine areas of the law if anyone has an out 
based on their claim to have reasonably 
misunderstood it. If we apply that rule to 
citizens facing the awesome power of the 
state, it seems only fair to apply the same 
rule to the state facing its citizens. 
Third, I agree with the Heien dissent that 
this is basically a remedies question under 
the guise of substantive Fourth Amendment 
law. If the exclusionary rule is going to be 
about officer culpability, then say that there 
is a Fourth Amendment violation here and 
no exclusionary remedy. But it doesn’t make 
much sense to harness the same principle to 
determine what is a Fourth Amendment 
violation in the first place: If you’re going to 
draw a sharp rights/remedies distinction, 
then I think the rationale for the rights and 
remedies should be kept separate. 
With that said, if this case goes up to the 
U.S. Supreme Court, I highly doubt a 
majority of the Court would share my initial 
instincts. If the U.S. Supreme Court takes 
this case, they will probably see this as an 
easy case for much of the same reason they 
saw Davis v. United States as an easy case: 
The officer acted reasonably based on the 
law known at the time, so the government 
should win. They might look at the legal 
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question differently in a case with better 
facts for the defense, but the facts here 
would seem to make a government win 
particularly likely. 
And finally, there’s a cynical case to be 
made that the ultimate outcome may not 
make much of a difference in the setting of 
traffic stops. As long as the Whren rule 
survives that a traffic violation alone 
justifies a stop, occasional ambiguities in the 
traffic laws are not likely to interfere much 
with traffic stops. If the officers can rely on 
reasonable mistakes of law, then the courts 
will allow the stops. And if the officers can’t 
rely on them, the police can go to the 
legislature and the legislature wil clarify the 
ambiguities in their favor. Either way, the 
police have the advantage in cases like this 
over the long haul so long as Whren is in 
place.
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Yates v. United States 
13-7451 
 
Ruling Below: United States of America v. John L. Yates, 733 F.3d 1059 (11th Cir. 2013), cert 
granted, 134 S.Ct. 1935 (2014). 
 
Defendant was convicted in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida of 
knowingly disposing of undersized fish in order to prevent government from taking lawful 
custody and control of them, and destroying or concealing “tangible object with the intent to 
impede, obstruct, or influence” government's investigation into harvesting undersized grouper. 
Defendant's motion for acquittal was denied. Defendant appealed. 
 
Question Presented: Whether Mr. Yates was deprived of fair notice that destruction of fish 
would fall within the purview of 18 U.S.C. § 1519, which makes it a crime for anyone who 
“knowingly alters, destroys, mutilates, conceals, covers up, falsifies, or makes a false entry in 
any record, document, or tangible object” with the intent to impede or obstruct an investigation, 
where the term “tangible object” is ambiguous and undefined in the statute, and unlike the nouns 
accompanying “tangible object” in section 1519, possesses no record-keeping, documentary, or 
informational content or purpose. 
 
 
UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellee 
v. 
John L. YATES, Defendant-Appellant. 
United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit 
Decided on August 16, 2013 
[Excerpt; some footnotes and citations omitted.] 
DUBINA, Circuit Judge. 
Appellant John L. Yates ("Yates") appeals 
his convictions for violating 18 U.S.C. §§ 
1519 and 2232(a), which arose out of his 
harvesting undersized red grouper in federal 
waters in the Gulf of Mexico. After 
reviewing the record, reading the parties' 
briefs, and having the benefit of oral 
argument, we affirm Yates's convictions.  
I.  
On August 17, 2007, Yates and his crew 
prepared the Miss Katie, a fishing vessel, for 
a fishing trip into federal waters in the Gulf 
of Mexico. On August 23, 2007, John Jones 
("Officer Jones"), a field officer with the 
Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation 
Commission, who was deputized by the 
National Marine Fisheries Service 
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("Fisheries Service") to enforce federal 
fisheries laws, was on an offshore patrol 
with fellow officers when he encountered 
the Miss Katie. Officer Jones noticed the 
Miss Katie was actively engaged in a 
commercial harvest using longline fishing 
gear, so he approached and boarded the Miss 
Katie to inspect for gear, fishery, and 
boating-safety compliance.  
While on board, Officer Jones noticed three 
red grouper that appeared to be less than 20 
inches in length, the minimum size limit for 
red grouper at that time. As a result, Officer 
Jones decided to measure Yates's fish to 
determine whether they were of legal size. 
Officer Jones separated grouper that 
appeared to be less than 20 inches so he 
could measure them. He measured the fish 
with their mouths closed and their tails 
pinched. Officer Jones gave Yates the 
benefit of the doubt on the fish that 
measured close to 20 inches but separated 
the fish that were clearly under the legal 
limit and placed those fish in wooden crates. 
In total, Officer Jones determined that 72 
grouper clearly measured less than 20 
inches. Officer Jones then placed the 
wooden crates in the Miss Katie's fish box 
and issued Yates a citation for the 
undersized fish. Officer Jones instructed 
Yates not to disturb the undersized fish and 
informed Yates that the Fisheries Service 
would seize the fish upon the Miss Katie's 
return to port.  
Contrary to Officer Jones's directions, Yates 
instructed his crew to throw the undersized 
fish overboard. Thomas Lemons 
("Lemons"), one of the crewmembers, 
testified that he complied with Yates's 
directive. At Yates's prompting, the crew 
then took other red grouper and placed them 
in the wooden crates that had held the 
undersized fish. After the switch was 
completed, Yates instructed Lemons to tell 
any law enforcement officers who asked that 
the fish in the wooden crates were the same 
fish that Officer Jones had determined were 
undersized.  
After the Miss Katie returned to port, 
Fisheries Service special agent James 
Kejonen ("Agent Kejonen") traveled to 
Cortez, Florida to meet Yates and 
investigate the report of undersized grouper. 
On August 27, 2007, Officer Jones was 
called in to remeasure the fish, which he did 
in the same manner as before — mouths 
closed and tails pinched. Sixty-nine fish 
measured less than 20 inches. Officer Jones 
noticed that, although some of Yates's 
undersized red grouper had previously 
measured as short as 18 to 19 inches, none 
of the grouper unloaded at the dock were 
that short. In fact, at sea, most of Yates's 
grouper had measured between 19 and 19 
1/2 inches, but at the dock, the majority of 
the grouper measured close to 20 inches. 
Due to Officer Jones's suspicion that the 
undersized fish measured on August 27 were 
not the same fish he had measured on 
August 23, federal agents interviewed 
Lemons, who eventually divulged the crew's 
nefarious conduct.  
At trial, Yates disputed whether the red 
grouper thrown overboard were actually 
undersized because Officer Jones had only 
measured the fish with their mouths closed, 
not open. In other words, Yates argued it 
was possible that, had the fish been 
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measured with their mouths open, they 
would have measured legal size. The day 
before trial, the district court held a Daubert 
hearing to evaluate the qualifications of the 
two grouper-measuring experts proffered by 
the parties. The government offered Dr. 
Richard Cody ("Dr. Cody"), a research 
administrator with the Fish and Wildlife 
Research Institute, as a potential expert 
witness. Dr. Cody was prepared to testify 
that, on average, a grouper measured three 
to four millimeters longer when its mouth 
was open versus when its mouth was closed. 
Yates did not object to that contention, but 
he did object to other portions of Dr. Cody's 
testimony. The district court took Dr. Cody's 
testimony under advisement but did not 
decide whether he could testify as an expert 
on measuring grouper. The district court 
also ruled that Yates's expert, William Ward 
("Mr. Ward"), research director for the Gulf 
Fishermen's Association, could offer 
testimony about a grouper's measurement 
with an open mouth as opposed to a closed 
mouth and about fish shrinkage when placed 
on ice.  
Ultimately, the government did not call Dr. 
Cody as a witness in its case-in-chief. After 
the government rested, Yates's counsel 
announced for the first time that he planned 
to call Dr. Cody as his first witness to testify 
about the length of grouper with an open 
mouth versus a closed mouth. The 
government objected. The district court 
sustained the government's objection, ruling 
that Yates was precluded from calling Dr. 
Cody in his case-in-chief because Yates had 
failed to properly notify the government of 
his intention to call Dr. Cody as an expert 
witness, as required by Federal Rule of 
Criminal Procedure 16. After the district 
court had made its ruling, Yates called as his 
first witness Mr. Ward, who testified that 
fish can shrink on ice and that grouper 
measure longer with their mouths open than 
with their mouths closed. On cross-
examination, the government questioned Mr. 
Ward about his own state and federal fishing 
violations.  
At the conclusion of the government's case-
in-chief, and at the close of all the evidence, 
Yates moved for judgment of acquittal on all 
counts. The district court denied both 
motions. After a four-day trial, the jury 
found Yates guilty of (1) knowingly 
disposing of undersized fish in order to 
prevent the government from taking lawful 
custody and control of them, in violation of 
18 U.S.C. § 2232(a) (Count I); and (2) 
destroying or concealing a "tangible object 
with the intent to impede, obstruct, or 
influence" the government's investigation 
into harvesting undersized grouper, in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1519 (Count II). 
The district court sentenced Yates to 30 
days' imprisonment, followed by 36 months' 
supervised release. Yates timely appealed 
his convictions.  
II.  
Yates presents three issues on appeal. First, 
Yates argues the district court erred in 
denying his motion for judgment of acquittal 
on Counts I and II, because the government 
failed to present sufficient evidence to prove 
the fish thrown overboard were undersized. 
Second, Yates argues the district court erred 
as a matter of law in denying his motion for 
judgment of acquittal on Count II, because 
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the term "tangible object" as used in 18 
U.S.C. § 1519 does not apply to fish. 
Alternatively, Yates argues the statute is 
ambiguous and the rule of lenity should 
apply. Finally, Yates argues the district court 
abused its discretion by precluding him from 
calling Dr. Cody during his case-in-chief.  
III.  
"We review de novo a district court's denial 
of a motion for judgment of acquittal on 
sufficiency of evidence grounds." "In 
reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, 
we look at the record in the light most 
favorable to the verdict and draw all 
reasonable inferences and resolve all 
questions of credibility in its favor." We 
review questions of statutory interpretation 
de novo.  
IV.  
A Sufficient evidence was presented at trial 
for the jury to conclude the fish thrown 
overboard were undersized.  
Yates contends that Officer Jones's failure to 
measure the fish with their mouths open — 
as opposed to only measuring them with 
their mouths closed — creates speculation as 
to whether the fish would have measured 
undersized with their mouths open. As such, 
he argues there was not sufficient evidence 
for the jury to conclude the fish thrown 
overboard were undersized. We disagree.  
First, the testimonial evidence given by 
Officer Jones, Agent Kejonen, and Mr. 
Ward conflicts as to whether measuring a 
fish with its mouth open, as opposed to 
closed, makes a difference in the fish's 
overall length. The jury was free to weigh 
the conflicting evidence and decide whether 
opening or closing a fish's mouth made a 
large difference, a small difference, or no 
difference at all in the fish's measurement. 
Further, Officer Jones testified that while he 
was on board the Miss Katie, Yates scolded 
his crew for keeping undersized fish and 
stated, "Look at this fish, it's only 19 inches. 
How could you miss this one?" Similarly, 
Agent Kejonen testified that, on the dock, 
Yates admitted to having at least "a few" 
undersized fish on his boat when Officer 
Jones measured them days earlier. 
Moreover, that Yates directed his crew to 
throw the fish overboard creates an 
inference that he — as an experienced 
commercial fisherman — believed the fish 
to be undersized. In sum, a "rational trier of 
fact could have found . . . beyond a 
reasonable doubt" that the fish thrown into 
the Gulf were shorter than the legal limit. 
Accordingly, we conclude from the record 
that sufficient evidence was presented at 
trial for the jury to convict Yates of Counts I 
and II.  
B. A fish is a "tangible object" within the 
meaning of 18 U.S.C. § 1519.  
Yates contends the district court erred in 
denying his motion for judgment of acquittal 
as to Count II because the term "tangible 
object" as used in 18 U.S.C. § 1519 "only 
applies to records, documents, or tangible 
items that relate to recordkeeping" and "does 
not apply to . . . fish."  
"In statutory construction, the plain meaning 
of the statute controls unless the language is 
ambiguous or leads to absurd results." 
"When the text of a statute is plain, . . . we 
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need not concern ourselves with contrary 
intent or purpose revealed by the legislative 
history." Further, undefined words in a 
statute — such as "tangible object" in this 
instance — are given their ordinary or 
natural meaning. In keeping with those 
principles, we conclude "tangible object," as 
§ 1519 uses that term, unambiguously 
applies to fish. Because the statute is 
unambiguous, we also conclude the rule of 
lenity does not apply here.  
C. Yates's right to present a defense was 
not prejudiced by the district court's riding 
that disallowed Yates from calling Dr. Cody 
during his case-in-chief.  
Because Yates waited until the close of the 
government's case-in-chief to disclose Dr. 
Cody as an expert witness, the disclosure 
was untimely under Federal Rule of 
Criminal Procedure 16(b)(1)(C). As a 
sanction for this untimely disclosure, the 
district court did not allow Dr. Cody to 
testify during Yates's case-in-chief. Yates 
does not dispute that he did not give proper 
notice to the government pursuant to Rule 
16(b)(1)(C). Instead, Yates argues that the 
district court should have used a lesser 
sanction to address his late disclosure, and 
that the district court's outright preclusion of 
Dr. Cody's testimony at trial infringed on 
Yates's constitutional right to present a 
defense. According to Yates, Dr. Cody 
would have reinforced his expert Mr. Ward's 
testimony that red grouper measure longer 
with their mouths open than with their 
mouths closed. Yates also contends Dr. 
Cody's corroboration of Mr. Ward's 
testimony would have countered the 
government's attempt to discredit Mr. Ward.  
"Relief for violations of discovery rules lies 
within the discretion of the trial court[.]"To 
warrant reversal of the court's discretion on 
appeal, "a defendant must show prejudice to 
his substantial rights." While the right of the 
accused to present a defense is a substantial 
right, that right is not boundless.  
It is unnecessary for us to determine whether 
the district court properly exercised its 
discretion in precluding Dr. Cody from 
testifying at trial, because we conclude 
Yates has failed to show the preclusion 
prejudiced his right to present a defense. As 
Yates conceded in his brief, his expert Mr. 
Ward offered the same testimony Yates 
hoped to elicit from Dr. Cody. Indeed, our 
review of the record shows Dr. Cody's 
testimony would have been less favorable to 
Yates than that of Mr. Ward. Moreover, 
under the circumstances presented here, 
Yates's inability to offer Dr. Cody's 
testimony to rehabilitate Dr. Ward's 
credibility does not amount to prejudice of 
his substantial rights.  
V.  
For the above stated reasons, we affirm 
Yates's convictions.  
AFFIRMED. 
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“Top U.S. Court to Hear White-Collar Case of Fish Thrown Overboard” 
Reuters 
Lawrence Hurley 
April 28, 2014 
A fisherman prosecuted under a white-collar 
crime law for disposing of fish while he was 
under investigation has persuaded the U.S. 
Supreme Court to hear his case. 
The court said on Monday that it will hear 
arguments over a jury's 2011 conviction of 
Florida fisherman John Yates on two of 
three charges, including one under the "anti-
shredding" provision of the 2002 Sarbanes-
Oxley law. 
The provision penalizes the destruction or 
concealment of "a tangible object with the 
intent to impede, obstruct or influence" a 
government investigation and was intended 
to prevent fraud of the sort committed by 
companies such as Enron Corp and 
WorldCom Inc. 
Yates's lawyer John Badalamenti said Yates 
did not receive fair notice that his actions 
would be covered by the provision. 
Prosecutors in Florida accused Yates of 
illegally destroying the evidence showing 
that he had harvested red grouper fish that 
were smaller than the minimum 20 inches in 
length required under federal regulations. 
Yates, who lives in Holmes Beach, 32 miles 
south of Tampa, has not been able get work 
as a fisherman following his trial, 
Badalamenti said. 
"He doesn't want this to happen to anyone 
else." 
Asked if Yates, 62, would be courting media 
attention like Nevada rancher Cliven Bundy, 
who last week battled federal agents over 
the cost of grazing rights on public land, 
Badalamenti demurred. 
"I don't think you are going to see him as a 
poster-child for any particular political 
persuasion," the lawyer said. 
The National Association of Criminal 
Defense Lawyers said in a friend-of-the-
court brief that the use of the Sarbanes-
Oxley law in Yates's case was an example of 
an increasing "over-criminalization 
epidemic" in which federal prosecutions 
punish conduct that could be handled with 
civil penalties or under state law. The 
association's brief noted that Yates was not 
charged with any violation of fishing laws. 
Yates has been backed also by Cause of 
Action, a conservative-leaning group critical 
of expansive criminal laws. 
Even if Yates wins his case before the high 
court, his conviction for one count of 
preventing the government from taking 
custody of the fish will remain intact. 
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Oral arguments and a decision are expected 
in the court's next term, which begins in 
October and ends in June 2015. 
Solicitor General Donald Verrilli, the 
government's lawyer before the Supreme 
Court, said in court papers that Yates was 
not disputing that he "directed the 
destruction or concealment of the fish" and 
that he had "obstructive intent." He wrote 
that a fish is a "tangible object" based on the 
"ordinary and natural meaning" of the 
phrase. 
The case began in August 2007 when 
federal and state officials measured fish on 
Yates's boat that they suspected were 
undersized. At that time, 72 were found to 
be under 20 inches, with some as short as 18 
to 19 inches. After the boat returned to port, 
agents re-measured the fish. Only 69 were 
undersized, and they were all closer to the 
20-inch mark. 
A crew member later testified at trial that 
Yates had told crew members to throw the 
undersized fish overboard and replace them 
with others. In August 2013, the 11th U.S. 
Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the 
conviction, finding in part that a fish fit 
within the definition of a "tangible object." 
The U.S. House of Representatives Judiciary 
Committee has both Republican and 
Democratic members studying concerns 
about federal laws being applied too 
broadly. It has heard testimony about cases 
including the prosecution of Lawrence 
Lewis, a janitor at a Washington, D.C., 
retirement home who was convicted of 
violating the Clean Water Act following a 
sewage backup. 
The case is United States v. Yates, U.S. 
Supreme Court, No. 13-7451. 
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“Fishy Application of Sarbanes-Oxley's Ban on Evidence Destruction” 
FindLaw 
William Peacock 
July 11, 2014 
One fish, two fish, red fish, short fish? 
John L. Yates is a commercial fisherman. In 
2007, he was hauling in some red grouper 
when a fisheries officer boarded his ship to 
inspect his haul. After measuring the fish 
and finding that some of them were less than 
the minimum size of 20 inches, he issued 
Yates a citation and set aside the short fish 
for inspection at the docks.  
Yates had his crew toss the short fish 
overboard and replace them with other fish. 
He was later convicted for violating an 
evidence destruction provision of the the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act banking reform statute, 
passed in the wake of the Enron scandal. 
He's appealing that conviction to the U.S. 
Supreme Court, arguing that the vague 
statute has no place in the Gulf of Mexico. 
Fine Points of Fish Measurement 
If you want to learn the fine points of fish 
measurement, the Eleventh Circuit's opinion 
is unintentionally hilarious. For example, 
opening and closing a fish's mouth can 
change its length by a few millimeters. And 
putting fish on ice can lead to shrinkage. 
The parties actually had experts lined up to 
testify about size and technique of 
measurement of Yate's red grouper. 
The real issue, however, is the application of 
a banking reform statute to a fisherman.  
What Is a 'Tangible Object'? 
Section 1519 punishes those who knowingly 
destroy or conceal "any record, document, 
or tangible object" in order to impede an 
investigation. And a fish, when it is 
evidence in a federal fisheries investigation, 
would seem to fit under the generic meaning 
of "tangible object." That's what the 
Eleventh Circuit held, anyway.  
Yates has appealed to the Supreme Court, 
asking whether the vague statute, which 
does not define "tangible object," could 
reasonably apply to an object that has "no 
record-keeping, documentary, or 
informational content or purpose." The 
Court has already granted cert., so this is set 
for next term's docket. 
A number of amicus briefs have been filed 
in the case in the last week, including an 
interesting argument from the Cato Institute. 
The Cato brief argues the context of the 
statute should aid interpretation, and in this 
case, "record, document or tangible object" 
indicates that "tangible object" should be 
limited to items related to records or 
documents (hard drives, diskettes, etc.). 
Otherwise, the overly broad dictionary 
definition used by the Eleventh Circuit 
would render "record" and "document" 
superfluous. 
That's certainly a good point: Statutes 
should be constructed so that no term is 
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superfluous. (This is the Rule Against 
Surplusage principle of statutory 
construction.) The Eleventh Circuit didn't 
address that argument in its one-paragraph 
approach to statutory interpretation, nor did 
it address Yates' argument about the Rule of 
Lenity, a canon which requires that statutes 
give notice of what conduct is illegal -- 
would a reasonable person expect a banking 
statute to be applied to flinging fish in the 
sea.
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“Fish Not Tangibles Under SOX, Defense Groups Tell Justices” 
Law360 
Carolina Bolado 
July 11, 2014 
A criminal defense attorney association and 
a number of criminal defense law professors 
have urged the U.S. Supreme Court to toss a 
Florida commercial fisherman's records 
destruction conviction for dumping three 
undersized red grouper, calling the 
conviction “overcriminalization through an 
unconstitutional expansion of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act."  
The National Association of Criminal 
Defense Lawyers, the American Fuel & 
Petrochemical Manufacturers and a group of 
18 criminal law professors filed amicus 
briefs on July 7 supporting John L. Yates, 
who was found guilty of the so-called anti-
shredding provision of the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act, which was passed in the wake of the 
Enron scandal in 2002. The law criminalizes 
the destruction of records, be they 
documents or tangible objects — which the 
Eleventh Circuit said includes fish. 
 
In its brief, the NACDL decried 
overcriminalization and said that Yates 
could not have been found guilty under 
federal law, because the application of the 
anti-shredding statute to “three rotten fish” 
is an unconstitutional expansion of the law. 
 
The law professors agreed, saying no one 
would reasonably expect the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act to apply to a fisherman throwing 
red grouper into the Gulf of Mexico. 
 
“In context, the phrase 'any record, 
document or tangible object' no more 
applies to fish than the phrase 'an 
automobile, automobile truck, automobile 
wagon, motorcycle or any other self-
propelled vehicle' applies to airplanes,” the 
professors said. 
 
They added that if the term “tangible object” 
in the statute includes fish, then the law 
“captures essentially every physical item 
within the jurisdictional reach of the United 
States.” 
 
The nation's highest court agreed in April to 
hear the appeal. The justices will have to 
consider whether the law can cover anything 
meeting the dictionary definition of the term 
“tangible object,” even when there is no 
connection to corporate records. 
 
Yates argues that any interpretation of the 
law should take into account the nouns 
accompanying the pivotal phrase, noting that 
fish possess no documentary purpose. 
 
The saga dates back to a summer 2007 
fishing trip on Yates' boat, the "Miss Katie." 
A Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation 
Commission officer spotted the vessel and 
inspected the fish that Yates and his crew 
had hauled in. 
 
The officer determined that 72 grouper met 
the federal minimum of 20 inches, but found 
three that were smaller and issued Yates a 
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citation. Although Yates was told to bring 
the fish back to port undisturbed for the 
Fisheries Service to seize, he instead told his 
crew to toss them overboard and replaced 
them with legally sized grouper, according 
to court documents. 
 
A federal jury found Yates guilty of 
disposing undersized fish and of violating 
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act's record-destruction 
provision, sentencing him to 30 days' 
imprisonment. The Eleventh Circuit upheld 
the ruling in August, finding that the phrase 
“tangible object” applies to fish. 
 
The law professors are represented by 
Steffen N. Johnson, Andrew C. Nichols, 
Eric M. Goldstein and Eric T. Werlinger of 
Winston & Strawn LLP. 
 
The NACDL and the American Fuel & 
Petrochemical Manufacturers are 
represented by William N. Shepherd of 
Holland & Knight LLP and NACDL 
attorney Barbara E. Bergman. 
 
Yates is represented by Assistant Federal 
Public Defender John L. Badalamenti and 
Federal Public Defender Donna Lee Elm of 
the Office of the Federal Public Defender 
for the Middle District of Florida. 
 
The federal government is represented by 
U.S. Solicitor General Donald B. Verrilli Jr.; 
and Acting Assistant Attorney General 
Mythili Raman and attorney John F. DePue 
of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
 
The case is Yates v. U.S., case number 13-
7451, in the Supreme Court of the United 
States. 
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“Commercial Fisherman's Conviction for Disposing of His Catch of 
Undersized Grouper Upheld” 
The Swartz Law Firm 
August 24, 2013 
In U.S. v. Yates the defendant and his crew 
were on a commercial fishing trip into the 
Gulf of Mexico when he was stopped by a 
federally deputized Florida Fish and 
Wildlife officer on patrol for fishery 
violations and compliance. After boarding 
the defendant's boat, he noticed red grouper 
that appeared to be less than the 20-inch 
minimum size limit. He measured them with 
mouths closed and determined there were 72 
grouper that clearly measured less than 20 
inches. He separated the undersized one into 
crates, issued a citation, and instructed the 
defendant not to disturb the crates. He told 
him that the National Marine Fisheries 
Service would seize them upon the vessel's 
return to port. Instead of following the 
instructions, the captain had his crew throw 
the undersized fish overboard and replaced 
them with other larger grouper. When the 
vessel returned to port in Florida and the 
officer measured the fish, he suspected they 
were not the same fish he previously 
measured. The switch was discovered after a 
crewmember was interviewed. The captain 
was charged and convicted of knowingly 
disposing of undersized fish in order to 
prevent the government from taking custody 
and control in violation of 18 U.S.C. 
§2232(a), and was convicted of destroying a 
"tangible object with the intent to impede 
obstruct or influence the government's 
investigation into harvesting undersized 
grouper" in violation of 18 U.S.C. §1519.  
Insufficient evidence argument rejected. 
The defendant argued on appeal there was 
insufficient evidence that the fish thrown 
overboard were undersized because the 
officer failed to measure the grouper with 
mouths open and instead measured them 
with mouths closed. He argued there is 
speculation as to whether the fish would 
have been undersized if measured with 
mouths opened. The court rejected this 
argument finding that there was conflicting 
testimony as to whether this would have 
made any difference, and the jury was free 
to weigh and decide the issue. Furthermore, 
the defendant's directing the crew to throw 
fish overboard together with his admission 
that he had at least a few undersized fish on 
his boat when the officer first measured 
them, was evidence he believed the fish 
were undersized.  
Fish are tangible objects 
The defendant argued that the term "tangible 
object" as used in 18 U.S.C. §1519 only 
apple to records, documents or items related 
to record keeping and does not apply to fish. 
The court decided that the statutory 
construction of the term would be given its 
plain meaning and concluded that tangible 
objects includes fish.  
Exclusion of expert on measuring fish was 
not prejudicial 
Finally, the defendant argued that he was 
prejudiced by the trial court's ruling 
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disallowing the defendant from calling an 
expert in his case-in-chief to testify that 
grouper measure three to four millimeters 
longer with mouth open versus when mouth 
closed. The defense failed to give notice to 
the government pursuant to Rule 
16(b)(1)(C) that it intended to call this 
expert witness and the trial court's sanction 
was not allowing the witness to testify. The 
court of appeals declined to determine if the 
district court exercise of its discretion was 
proper because the defendant failed to show 
any prejudice by the preclusion of this 
testimony.
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NEW TOPIC: DEATH PENALTY PROTOCOLS 
“Court Extends Curbs on the Death Penalty in a Florida Ruling” 
The New York Times 
Adam Liptak 
May 27, 2014 
 
The Supreme Court on Tuesday continued a 
trend to limit capital punishment, ruling that 
Florida’s I.Q. score cutoff was too rigid to 
decide which mentally disabled individuals 
must be spared the death penalty. 
“Florida seeks to execute a man because he 
scored a 71 instead of a 70 on an I.Q. test,” 
Justice Anthony M. Kennedy wrote for the 
majority in a 5-to-4 decision. 
Justice Kennedy was joined by the court’s 
four-member liberal wing, a recurring 
coalition in cases concerning harsh 
punishments. 
When the court barred the execution of 
people with mental disabilities in 2002 in 
Atkins v. Virginia, it largely let the states 
determine who qualified. Tuesday’s 
decision, Justice Samuel A. Alito Jr. wrote 
for the four dissenters, represented a “sea 
change” in the court’s approach. 
The ruling will affect not only Florida, 
which has the nation’s second-largest death 
row after California, but also as many as 
eight other states by Justice Kennedy’s 
count, including Alabama and Virginia. 
They will now be required to take a less 
mechanical approach to mental disability in 
capital cases, said Eric M. Freedman, a law 
professor at Hofstra.  
“Death row inmates commonly suffer from 
multidimensional mental problems,” Mr. 
Freedman said. “Today’s ruling requires 
courts to investigate these fully, by looking 
at the elephant rather than the tail.” 
In Tuesday’s decision, Justice Kennedy said 
that closer supervision of the states was 
warranted given the nature of the 
punishment. “The death penalty is the 
gravest sentence our society may impose,” 
he wrote. “Persons facing that most severe 
sanction must have a fair opportunity to 
show that the Constitution prohibits their 
execution. Florida’s law contravenes our 
nation’s commitment to dignity and its duty 
to teach human decency as the mark of a 
civilized world.” 
The case, Hall v. Florida, arose from the 
1978 murder of Karol Hurst, who was 21 
and seven months pregnant when Freddie L. 
Hall and an accomplice forced her into her 
car in a supermarket parking lot. She was 
found in a wooded area, where she had been 
beaten, sexually assaulted and shot. 
There was significant evidence in school and 
court records of Mr. Hall’s intellectual 
disability. Before the Supreme Court’s 
decision in the Atkins case, a trial judge 
found that there was “substantial evidence” 
that Mr. Hall “has been mentally retarded 
his entire life.” 
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After the Atkins decision, Mr. Hall 
challenged his death sentence, relying in 
part on the earlier state court determinations. 
The Atkins decision gave states only general 
guidance. It said a finding of intellectual 
disability required proof of three things: 
“subaverage intellectual functioning,” 
meaning low I.Q. scores; a lack of 
fundamental social and practical skills; and 
the presence of both conditions before age 
18. The court said I.Q. scores under 
“approximately 70” typically indicate 
disability. 
A Florida law enacted not long before the 
Atkins decision created what Mr. Hall’s 
lawyers called an “inflexible bright-line 
cutoff” requiring proof of an I.Q. of 70 or 
below. 
In 2012, the Florida Supreme Court ruled 
that Mr. Hall was eligible to be executed 
because his I.Q. had been measured at 
various times as 71, 73, and 80. 
That approach, Justice Kennedy wrote, had 
at least two flaws. One was that it failed to 
take account of standard errors of 
measurement. 
“An individual’s score is best understood as 
a range of scores on either side of the 
recorded score,” he wrote. 
The second problem, he said, was that a 
rigid cutoff excluders consideration of other 
evidence. “Intellectual disability is a 
condition, not a number,” he wrote. 
Justice Alito protested that this changed the 
rules announced in Atkins, which required 
both low scores and more practical proof. 
He was also sharply critical of the court’s 
reliance on the views of medical experts, 
saying the majority had overruled part of the 
Atkins decision “based largely on the 
positions adopted by private professional 
organizations.” 
The Supreme Court assesses whether given 
practices are barred by the Eighth 
Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and 
unusual punishment by considering, in the 
words of a 1958 decision, “the evolving 
standards of decency that mark the progress 
of a maturing society.” 
In doing so, Justice Alito said, it had always 
“meant the standards of American society as 
a whole.” 
“Now, however,” he wrote, “the court 
strikes down a state law based on the 
evolving standards of professional societies, 
most notably the American Psychiatric 
Association.” 
Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr. and 
Justices Antonin Scalia and Clarence 
Thomas joined the dissent. 
The majority and dissenting opinions 
clashed over statistics and over how many 
states had laws similar to Florida’s. By 
Justice Kennedy’s count, Kentucky and 
Virginia have adopted a fixed cutoff of 70 
by statute, and Alabama by court decision. 
Five other states (Arizona, Delaware, 
Kansas, North Carolina and Washington), 
Justice Kennedy said, have laws open to the 
same interpretation. 
Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen G. 
Breyer, Sonia Sotomayor and Elena Kagan 
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joined the majority opinion. In earlier 
decisions limiting the use of the death 
penalty and other harsh punishments under 
the Eighth Amendment, Justice Kennedy has 
often joined the court’s liberal wing. He 
wrote several of those decisions, sometimes 
using the soaring language that marked his 
majority opinion on Tuesday. 
“The Eighth Amendment’s protection of 
dignity,” he wrote, “reflects the nation we 
have been, the nation we are, and the nation 
we aspire to be. This is to affirm that the 
nation’s constant, unyielding purpose must 
be to transmit the Constitution so that its 
precepts and guarantees retain their meaning 
and force.” 
Justice Kennedy was also in the majority in 
cases striking down the death penalty for the 
mentally disabled, for juvenile offenders and 
for non-homicide crime and in ones limiting 
the use of life without parole sentences for 
juvenile offenders. 
The court returned Mr. Hall’s case to the 
lower courts for a fresh assessment of his 
condition. “Freddie Lee Hall may or may 
not be intellectually disabled,” Justice 
Kennedy wrote, “but the law requires that he 
have the opportunity to present evidence of 
his intellectual disability, including deficits 
in adaptive functioning over his lifetime.” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
500 
 
“Arizona Execution Will Move Forward After Last-Minute Appeals” 
Time 
Josh Sanburn 
July 23, 2014 
 
A rare victory for a death row inmate over 
the weekend was quashed Tuesday when the 
Supreme Court lifted a stay of execution for 
Joseph Wood, who was sentenced to death 
for the murder of his girlfriend and her 
father in 1989. 
In a three-sentence order, the Supreme Court 
reversed a judgment by the U.S. Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals that halted Wood’s 
execution based on the secrecy surrounding 
where the state obtains the drugs to carry out 
lethal injection. About a half-hour after 
Wood was scheduled to be executed, 
Arizona’s top court announced that it had 
temporarily halted the execution on appeals. 
Wood’s lawyers said he did not have proper 
legal representation. They also claimed that 
Arizona’s “experimental” lethal injection 
methods, which include drugs like 
midazolam that have been used 
in executions that have gone awry in other 
states, would violate the Eighth 
Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual 
punishment. But that stay was lifted 
Wednesday afternoon after the court heard 
last-minute appeals from Wood’s lawyers, 
clearing the way for Wood to be executed by 
lethal injection. 
Death row inmates around the U.S. have 
challenged the constitutionality of their 
lethal injections, often arguing that the laws 
and policies shielding drug manufacturers’ 
identities are unconstitutional. Due to drug 
shortages and boycotts by pharmaceutical 
companies, many states in the last few years 
have obtained lethal injection drugs from 
compounding pharmacies, which are 
unregulated by the federal government. 
Courts around the country have been largely 
unreceptive to those arguments. Wood’s 
case, however, was an exception. 
Wood’s lawyers asked the state to halt his 
execution if it did not provide the origins of 
the drugs as well as the qualifications of the 
executioners, relying not on an Eighth 
Amendment argument regarding the risk of 
cruel and unusual punishment, but rather a 
First Amendment defense that Wood had a 
right to access information about his 
execution. A U.S. District Court judge in 
Phoenix initially denied the request, but the 
Ninth Circuit sided with Wood. 
The court denied appeals by the state to lift 
the stay, sending the case to the Supreme 
Court, which has been reluctant to step into 
the ongoing battle over lethal injection. 
But while the fate of lethal injection in the 
U.S. remains uncertain, reverting to an older 
method of executions got an unexpected 
endorsement. In a separate opinion by the 
Ninth Circuit that upheld Wood’s stay of 
execution before the Supreme Court 
intervened, Judge Alex Kozinski called 
lethal injection flawed and proposed 
bringing back the firing squad. 
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“If some states and the federal government 
wish to continue carrying out the death 
penalty, they must turn away from this 
misguided path and return to more 
primitive—and foolproof—methods of 
execution,” Judge Kozinski wrote. “The 
guillotine is probably best but seems 
inconsistent with our national ethos. And the 
electric chair, hanging and the gas chamber 
are each subject to occasional mishaps. The 
firing squad strikes me as the most 
promising. Eight or ten large-caliber bullets 
fired at close range can inflict massive 
damage, causing instant death every time. … 
Sure, firing squads can be messy, but if we 
are willing to carry out executions, we 
should not shield ourselves from the reality 
that we are shedding human blood.” 
Legislators in several states have 
proposed bringing back firing squads. Only 
Oklahoma and Utah currently allow them, 
according to the Death Penalty Information 
Center, but only under very limited 
circumstances. 
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“Arizona Killer Takes Two Hours to Die, Fueling Lethal Injection Debate” 
LA Times 
Matt Pearce, Cindy Carcamo, & Maya Srikrishnan 
July 23, 2014 
A convicted murderer in Arizona gasped and 
snorted for more than 90 minutes after a 
lethal injection Wednesday, his attorneys 
and witnesses said, dying in a botched 
execution that prompted the governor to 
order an investigation and the state Supreme 
Court to mandate that the materials used in 
the procedure be preserved. 
Joseph Rudolph Wood III's execution almost 
certainly will reinvigorate the national 
debate over the death penalty. He received 
an injection at 1:52 p.m. at the Arizona State 
Prison Complex in Florence. The execution 
became so prolonged that reporters 
witnessing the execution counted several 
hundred of his wheezes before he was 
finally declared dead at 3:49 p.m. — nearly 
two hours after the procedure began. 
The incident comes in a year in which lethal 
injections had already triggered controversy 
over botched procedures and secrecy. 
Wood had fought without success to get 
more information about the drugs and the 
expertise of his executioners. His request, 
which was rejected by the U.S. Supreme 
Court, prompted one prominent appellate 
judge to call for the return of the firing 
squad. 
The Arizona Supreme Court ordered 
officials to preserve the remaining drugs 
used in his execution and the drug labels. 
Gov. Jan Brewer ordered the state 
Department of Corrections to conduct a full 
review, saying she was “concerned” about 
the length of time it took Wood to die. 
“One thing is certain, however, inmate 
Wood died in a lawful manner, and by 
eyewitness and medical accounts he did not 
suffer,” Brewer said in a statement. “This is 
in stark comparison to the gruesome, vicious 
suffering that he inflicted on his two victims 
— and the lifetime of suffering he has 
caused their family.” 
Wood, 55, was sentenced to death in 1991 
for the August 1989 shooting deaths of his 
estranged girlfriend, Debra Dietz, and her 
father, Eugene Dietz, in Tucson. 
Wood's last words were to his victims' 
family, according to an Associated Press 
reporter who witnessed the execution: “I 
take comfort knowing today my pain stops, 
and I said a prayer that on this or any other 
day you may find peace in all of your hearts 
and may God forgive you all.” 
It took so long for Wood to die after 
receiving an injection of midazolam 
combined with hydromorphone that his 
attorneys filed emergency appeals to save 
his life. 
“At 1:57 p.m [officials] reported that Mr. 
Wood was sedated, but at 2:02 he began to 
breathe,” said the legal filing in federal court 
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from public defender Jon M. Sands. “At 
2:03 his mouth moved. Mr. Wood has 
continued to breathe since that time. He has 
been gasping and snorting for more than an 
hour. At 3:02 p.m. ... staff rechecked for 
sedation. He is still alive.” 
A Wood attorney also went to the state 
Supreme Court, which was conducting a 
hearing by telephone when he was 
pronounced dead. 
The question of whether he suffered divided 
those who watched the procedure. 
Another attorney for Wood, Dale A. Baich, 
was among them. He said that during the 1 
hour and 40 minutes Wood was gasping and 
snorting, he could not tell whether he was 
conscious. “There was no sound in the 
witness room, so we could not hear,” he 
said. 
A spokeswoman for the Arizona attorney 
general's office who was also a witness 
disputed that. “There was no gasping of air. 
There was snoring,” Stephanie Grisham 
said. “He just laid there. It was quite 
peaceful.” 
Baich responded: “My observation was that 
he was gasping and struggling to breathe. I 
couldn't tell if he was snoring. Even if he 
was snoring, it took two hours for him to 
die?” 
Baich called for an independent 
investigation. 
Wood's prolonged death drew an outcry 
from capital punishment opponents. 
“It's time for Arizona and the other states 
still using lethal injection to admit that this 
experiment with unreliable drugs is a 
failure,” Cassandra Stubbs, director of the 
American Civil Liberties Union's Capital 
Punishment Project, said in a statement. 
“Instead of hiding lethal injection under 
layers of foolish secrecy, these states need to 
show us where the drugs are [coming] from. 
Until they can give assurances that the drugs 
will work as intended, they must stop future 
executions.” 
Megan McCracken of the Death Penalty 
Clinic at UC Berkeley School of Law 
concurred: “We see that when the state is 
allowed to carry out an execution with an 
experimental drug combination without 
scrutiny and oversight, the consequences are 
absolutely horrific.” 
Wood's execution revived memories of 
those in Ohio and Oklahoma this year. 
Ohio used the same drug combination to 
execute Dennis McGuire in January. 
Witnesses said that “McGuire started 
struggling and gasping loudly for air, 
making snorting and choking sounds which 
lasted for at least 10 minutes, with his chest 
heaving and his fist clenched.” Ohio 
executions are on hold while a federal court 
reviews the state's execution protocol. 
Then, in April, Oklahoma murderer Clayton 
Lockett died of a heart attack 43 minutes 
after his execution began — and after the 
state had called off his execution as he 
writhed and gasped. Details about the lethal 
drugs and those who administer them are 
kept secret in many states. Wood had 
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launched a 1st Amendment attack on that 
veil of secrecy, arguing that the public has a 
right to know more about the state's gravest 
responsibility. 
The U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals 
agreed, halting his execution with a 
preliminary injunction Saturday. The U.S. 
Supreme Court lifted the injunction 
Tuesday. Arizona's state Supreme Court also 
allowed the execution to go ahead. 
The chief judge of the 9th Circuit, Alex 
Kozinski, had supported Wood's execution 
but suggested that lethal drugs should be 
replaced with something more 
efficient, such as firing squads. 
The latest botched execution could force the 
U.S. Supreme Court to reconsider the issue. 
Six years ago, the court rejected a “cruel and 
unusual punishment” challenge to lethal 
injections in a Kentucky case but left the 
door open for future challenges. 
Among the witnesses were the victims' 
family. 
“This man conducted a horrific murder, and 
you guys are going, ‘Let's worry about the 
drugs,'” Richard Brown, Debra Dietz's 
brother-in-law, told reporters. “Why didn't 
they give him a bullet, why didn't we give 
him Drano?” 
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“One Execution Botched, Oklahoma Delays the Next” 
New York Times 
Erik Eckholm 
April 29, 2014 
What was supposed to be the first of two 
executions here on Tuesday night was halted 
when prisoner, Clayton D. Lockett, began to 
writhe and gasp after he had already been 
declared unconscious and called out “oh, 
man,” according to witnesses. 
The administering doctor intervened and 
discovered that “the line had blown,” said 
the director of corrections, Robert Patton, 
meaning that drugs were no longer flowing 
into Mr. Lockett’s vein. 
At 7:06 p.m., Mr. Patton said, Mr. Lockett 
died in the execution chamber, of a heart 
attack. 
Mr. Patton said the governor had agreed to 
his request for a stay of 14 days in the 
second execution scheduled for Tuesday 
night, that of Charles F. Warner. 
It was a chaotic and disastrous step in 
Oklahoma’s long effort to execute the two 
men, overcoming their objections that the 
state would not disclose the source of the 
drugs being used in a newly tried 
combination. 
According to Mr. Patton, it was the method 
of administration, not the drugs themselves, 
that failed, but it resulted in what witnesses 
called an agonizing scene. 
“This was botched, and it was difficult to 
watch,” said David Autry, one of Mr. 
Lockett’s lawyers. 
Dean Sanderford, another lawyer for Mr. 
Lockett, said, “It looked like torture.” 
A medical technical inserted the IV needle 
and then the first drug, a sedative intended 
to knock the man out and forestall pain, was 
administered at 6:23 p.m.  Ten minutes later, 
the doctor announced that Mr. Lockett was 
unconscious, and the team started to 
administer the next two drugs, a paralytic 
and one intended to make the heart stop. 
At that point, witnesses said, things began to 
go awry.  Mr. Lockett’s body twitched, his 
foot shook and he mumbled, witnesses said. 
At 6:37 p.m., he tried to rise and exhaled 
loudly.  At that point, prison officials pulled 
a curtain in front of the witnesses and the 
doctor discovered a “vein failure,” Mr. 
Patton said. 
Without effective sedation, the second two 
drugs are known to cause agonizing 
suffocation and pain. 
Mr. Lockett’s apparent revival and writhing 
raised questions about the doctor’s initial 
declaration that he was unconscious and are 
sure to cast doubt on the effectiveness of the 
sedative used. 
Gov. Mary Fallin said late Tuesday, “I have 
asked the Department of Corrections to 
conduct a full review of Oklahoma’s 
execution procedures to determine what 
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happened and why during this evening’s 
execution of Clayton Derrell Lockett.” 
Madeline Cohen, a federal public defender 
and lawyer for Mr. Warner, said that while 
prison officials asserted that the problem 
was only with the intravenous line, “unless 
we have a full and independent 
investigation, we’ll never know.” 
“No execution should take place in 
Oklahoma until there has been a full 
investigation into Clayton Lockett’s death, 
including an independent autopsy and full 
transparency surrounding the drugs and the 
process of administering them,” she said. 
The appeals for disclosure about the drug 
sources, supported by a state court in March, 
threw Oklahoma’s highest courts and 
elected officials into weeks of conflict and 
disarray, with courts arguing over which 
should consider the request for a politically 
unpopular stay of execution, the governor 
defying the State Supreme Court’s ruling for 
a delay, and a legislator seeking 
impeachment of the justices. 
The planned executions of Mr. Lockett, 38, 
and Mr. Warner, 46, dramatized the growing 
tension nationally over secrecy in lethal 
injections as drug companies, saying they 
are fearful of political and even physical 
attack, refuse to supply drugs, and many 
states scramble to find new sources and try 
untested combinations.  Several states have 
imposed secrecy on the suppliers of lethal 
injection drugs, leading to court battles over 
due process and the ban on cruel and usual 
punishment. 
Lawyers for the two convicts said the lack of 
supplier information made it impossible to 
know if the drugs were safe and effective, or 
might possibly violate the ban on cruel and 
unusual punishment. 
Officials swore that the drugs had been 
obtained legally from licensed pharmacies 
and had not expired.  Ms. Fallin, expressing 
the view of many here, said earlier Tuesday, 
“Two men that do not contest their guilt in 
heinous murders will now face justice.” 
But that sentiment was overshadowed by 
Tuesday night’s bungled execution, which is 
certain to generate more challenges to lethal 
injection, long considered the most human 
of execution methods. 
Mr. Lockett was convicted of shooting a 19-
year-old woman in 1999 and burying her 
alive.  Mr. Warner, condemned for the rape 
and murder of an 11-month-old girl in 1997, 
was to be executed two hours later. 
The two men spent Tuesday in adjacent 
cells, visited by their lawyers and, in Mr. 
Warner’s case, family members.  The 
hulking white penitentiary in this small town 
in southeast Oklahoma, amid prairies now 
green from soaking spring rains, is the 
prison from which Tom Joad is paroled in 
the opening pages of John Steinbeck’s “The 
Grapes of Wrath.” 
In keeping with the untried drug protocol 
announced by the Corrections Department 
this month, Mr. Lockett was first injected 
with midazolam, a benzodiazepine intended 
to render the prisoner unconscious.  This 
was to be followed by injections of 
vecuronium bromide, a paralyzing agent that 
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stops breathing, and then potassium 
chloride, which stops the heart. 
This combination has been used in Florida, 
but with a much higher dose of midazolam 
than Oklahoma used. 
Faced with shortages, Oklahoma and other 
states have turned to compounding 
pharmacies – lightly regulated laboratories 
that mix up drugs to order.  Opponents have 
raised questions about quality control, 
especially after the widely reported dying 
gasps of a convict in Ohio for more than 10 
minutes, and an Oklahoma inmate’s 
utterance, “I feel my whole body burning,” 
after being injected with compounded drugs. 
Oklahoma later said it had found a federally 
approved manufacturer to provide the drugs 
for Tuesday’s executions, but refused to 
identify it. 
Oklahoma’s attorney general, Scott Pruitt, 
derided the lawsuits over drug secrecy, 
calling them delaying tactics.  Many legal 
experts, especially death penalty opponents, 
say otherwise. 
“Information on the drug that is intended to 
act as the anesthetic is crucial to ensure that 
the execution will be humane,” said Jennifer 
Moreno, a lawyer with the Berkeley Law 
School’s Death Penalty Clinic. 
Elsewhere, Texas has refused to reveal 
where it obtained a new batch of 
compounded drugs; a challenge before the 
State Supreme Court.  Georgia passed a law 
last year making information about lethal 
drug suppliers a “confidential state secret”; a 
challenge is also pending in that state’s top 
court. 
This month, the United States Supreme 
Court declined to hear suits attacking drug 
secrecy in Missouri and Louisiana. 
But three of the justices expressed interest, 
and the issue seems likely to be considered 
by the Supreme Court at some point, said 
Eric M. Freedman, a professor of 
constitutional law at Hofstra University. 
In March, it appeared that Mr. Lockett and 
Mr. Warner had won the right to know more 
about the drugs when an Oklahoma judge 
ruled that the secrecy law was 
unconstitutional.  But the judge said she did 
not have the authority to grant the men stays 
of execution, sending the inmates into a 
Kafkaesque legal maze. 
The state’s Court of Criminal Appeals 
repeatedly turned back the Supreme Court’s 
order to rule on a stay, while the attorney 
general insisted that the executions would go 
ahead. 
On April 21, the Supreme Court said that to 
avoid a miscarriage of justice, it would delay 
the executions until it had time to resolve the 
secrecy matter. 
The next day, Ms. Fallin, a Republican, said 
the Supreme Court had overstepped its 
powers, and she directed officials to carry 
out both executions on April 29.  An 
outraged legislator, Representative Mike 
Christian, said he would seek to impeach the 
justices, who were already under fire from 
conservative legislators for striking down 
laws the court deemed unconstitutional. 
A constitutional crisis appeared to be 
brewing.  But last Wednesday, the Supreme 
Court announced a decision on the secrecy 
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issue – overturning the lower court and declaring that the executions could proceed. 
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 “Gambling With Death:  Is the Supreme Court Poised to Abolish the Death 
Penalty?” 
Slate 
Evan Mandery 
July 24, 2014 
 
Abolitionists have ample reason to believe a 
Supreme Court decision declaring the death 
penalty unconstitutional is within their 
grasp. After another botched execution this 
week, it must look like the day is coming 
ever closer. 
Over the past dozen years, the court has 
gradually narrowed the permissible uses of 
capital punishment, rejecting its use for 
juveniles, child rapists who did not kill, and 
the mentally retarded. This past May, 
in Hall v. Florida, the court also announced 
that mental retardation couldn’t be 
determined by a hard and fast numeric rule, 
which Florida and other states had used to 
limit the impact of the court’s ban. 
Those decisions suggest to court watchers 
that there may finally be a five-justice 
majority to reject the death penalty in all 
cases. The questions folks are asking are 
who are they and when will it happen. The 
liberal wing seems dependable. Justices 
Stephen Breyer and Ruth Bader Ginsburg 
have both consistently voted against the 
death penalty. Last year, Justice Sonia 
Sotomayor dissented from the court’s 
refusal to hear a challenge to Alabama’s 
death penalty law, which allows a judge to 
override a jury’s recommendation of mercy. 
Based on Justice Elena Kagan’s vote 
in Hall and her legal pedigree—which 
includes a stint clerking for Thurgood 
Marshall, an outspoken death penalty 
opponent—there’s ample reason to believe 
she’d be receptive to a constitutional 
challenge to capital punishment as well. 
There’s also ample reason to believe that a 
fifth vote could come from Justice Anthony 
Kennedy. In fact, one could argue that 
Kennedy’s vote is even more dependable 
than the others. The juvenile case (Roper v. 
Simmons), the child rapist case (Kennedy v. 
Louisiana), and Hall, were all 5–4 decisions. 
In each, Kennedy both cast the decisive vote 
and wrote the majority opinion. Over the 
years, his position on capital punishment has 
become more principled and his rhetoric 
increasingly robust. In Hall, Kennedy wrote 
that executing an intellectually disabled 
individual “violates his or her inherent 
dignity as a human being” and serves “no 
legitimate penological purpose.” He has also 
repeatedly expressed concern with 
America’s international position as a grim 
outlier on the death penalty and, as far back 
as a 2003 speech to the American Bar 
Association, has said that he is deeply 
troubled by the American criminal justice 
system generally. 
And suddenly this week, two broad-based 
challenges to capital punishment have been 
hand-delivered to death penalty 
abolitionists. If the court is standing by, it 
should be on notice that the situation on the 
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ground is changing. Judge Cormac Carney’s 
decision last week rejecting the California 
death penalty as unconstitutionally arbitrary 
is remarkable. It is also a template for a 
Supreme Court brief seeking to abolish the 
death penalty nationwide. Furman v. 
Georgia, a 1972 decision striking down the 
death penalty as then practiced as 
unconstitutional, and Gregg v. Georgia, a 
1976 decision upholding revised death 
penalty laws, require states to create 
nonarbitrary sentencing systems. Carney’s 
conclusion last week is that this mandate is 
violated by his state’s practice of executing 
only a random few murderers. California 
executes a smaller percentage of death-
sentenced murderers than any other capital 
punishment state, but the randomness 
argument could be made about any other 
death penalty state. Capital sentencing 
everywhere is infected by racism and 
classism. 
The second sign that things could be 
changing is Joseph Wood’s botched 
execution Wednesday night. It, too, lays the 
foundation for a compelling potential 
argument for doing away with capital 
punishment. In 2008, the court rejected by 
7–2 a challenge to Kentucky’s lethal 
injection protocol. The plurality opinion, 
authored by Chief Justice John Roberts and 
joined by Kennedy, held that “an isolated 
mishap alone does not violate the Eighth 
Amendment,” but after Wood this week, 
and Clayton Lockett’s botched execution in 
April, it’s difficult to characterize these 
mishaps as isolated. They are starting to 
look more like the norm. 
Abolitionists have other reasons to believe 
the lethal injection decision might be 
reversed or modified. Breyer’s vote with the 
majority in that 2008 case was tepid and 
based in part of the insufficiency of the 
evidence of suffering. Also, Kagan has 
replaced John Paul Stevens, who voted with 
the majority to uphold Kentucky’s lethal 
injection system. 
So is the court poised with five votes to end 
capital punishment? Of course, Kennedy’s 
vote is hardly a sure thing. Wood’s lawyers 
asked Kennedy to stay the execution 
midway through the two-hour procedure. 
Kennedy refused. He also cast a decisive 
fifth vote in a 2005 case upholding Kansas’ 
death penalty law, which says that when a 
jury finds the aggravating and mitigating 
evidence against a defendant to be equal, the 
tie should go to death. Michael Meltsner, 
who was the first associate counsel of the 
NAACP Legal Defense Fund during its 
litigation campaign in the 1960s and ’70s 
says, “I don’t think Kennedy is there yet.” 
One might worry, too, about Kagan, who 
said she accepted the constitutionality of 
capital punishment during her confirmation 
hearings. 
It’s possible that the prospects for 
overturning the death penalty might get 
stronger if a Democrat wins the 2016 
election and has the opportunity to replace 
Kennedy or one or more of the conservative 
justices with a more reliable vote for 
abolition. But perhaps a Democrat will not 
win, and perhaps Kennedy, who is 78, will 
retire and be replaced by a far more strident 
conservative in the mold of Justices Samuel 
Alito or Antonin Scalia. Kennedy’s bona 
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fides as a critic of the death penalty and the 
American criminal justice system are 
substantial. For the foreseeable future, this is 
probably the best opportunity abolitionists 
have to end the death penalty in America. 
If, as some suspect, the five votes are indeed 
there, the failure to press a case to the court 
means the death penalty could linger long 
beyond its natural life. If the votes aren’t 
there, on the other hand, pressing a case to 
the court could do great harm. It’s a massive 
gamble. The justices might say that the 
arbitrariness problem has been fixed and 
give the American public further confidence 
in capital punishment. If that happened, it’s 
hard to imagine the court returning to the 
issue anytime soon. One gets a crack at 
these issues only every 50–100 years. 
Carol Steiker, the Henry J. Friendly 
Professor of Law at Harvard Law School, 
says this of the abolition gamble: 
It’s a tough call. On the one hand, 
there’s been a stunning sea change in 
the use of the death penalty, including 
abolitions at the state level, declines in 
both execution and death sentencing 
rates, decline in public support, and 
powerful international pressure against 
the practice. Add to that the 
geographical isolation of the death 
penalty, which is used robustly in only a 
few states and only a few counties 
within those states, and it’s easy to see 
capital punishment as a practice that the 
court might deem to be marginalized 
and withering. On the other hand, the 
raw numbers aren’t as strong as they 
were in any of the cases in which the 
Supreme Court has ruled particular 
death penalty practices unconstitutional. 
If you bring a global challenge and lose, 
it may make it harder to succeed in the 
future. If you take a shot at the king, 
you better kill him. 
So, it’s a roll of the dice, and the stakes 
could hardly be higher, but notably, no one’s 
stepping up to roll those dice. In the 1960s, 
Meltsner, Tony Amsterdam, and the 
NAACP Legal Defense Fund were in clear 
control of the death penalty abolition 
campaign. For better or worse, they 
determined which issues should be brought 
before the court and in which order. It’s 
impossible to imagine Furman having been 
won without their efforts. But today, there’s 
no organized abolition program and no 
Amsterdam or Meltsner. The gay marriage 
movement has Ted Olson and David Boies. 
The abolition campaign has no such 
leadership. That’s not to say no one is 
advocating against the death penalty or 
representing the interests of people on death 
row. They are. But no one is systematically 
leading the thinking about how to influence 
the Supreme Court through a series of 
challenges and cases. As Meltsner says, 
“The issues are far from as clear cut as they 
were in the 1960s,” and points to the 
influence of discrimination as an organizing 
principle. “It was easy for us in a way,” he 
said. “We began with race. We never left 
race in a way. No matter how awful the 
criminals were, randomness was worse 
because it was based on race.” 
Whatever brought them and bound them to 
the cause, one can’t help but wish for a new 
Meltsner or Amsterdam to emerge. There 
may very well be a historic opportunity at 
hand. It’d be a shame if it slipped by solely 
for a lack of leadership.
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“Can the Death Penalty Survive Lethal Injection?” 
U.S. News & World Report 
Tierney Sneed 
August 7, 2014 
 
Missouri’s execution of Michael 
Worthington, who was convicted of raping 
and murdering his neighbor, went as 
planned early Wednesday morning. Appeals 
for clemency to Democratic Gov. Jay Nixon 
and for a stay to the U.S. Supreme Court 
were denied, despite recent concerns 
expressed about botched executions. 
Worthington's punishment comes after the 
last U.S. inmate to be executed, Joseph 
Rudolph Wood III in Arizona, snored and by 
some accounts gasped loudly throughout the 
two-hour procedure, which his lawyers had 
contested over the effectiveness and source 
of the drugs being used to kill him. After a 
similarly alarming April execution in 
Oklahoma, President Barack Obama – who 
supports capital punishment – instructed the 
Department of Justice to review death 
penalty protocols, meaning that despite the 
relative success of lethal injection in 
Worthington’s execution, questions about its 
viability – particularly challenges in 
obtaining and administering the drugs – 
aren’t likely to go away. 
Missouri executed Michael Worthington 
early Wednesday morning for raping and 
killing a female neighbor in 1995.  
While people on both sides of the death 
penalty issue agree there are problems with 
lethal injection procedures that need to be 
addressed – including a pro-death penalty 
appellate judge on the 9th U.S. Circuit who 
said ahead of the Arizona execution it was 
time to go back to the firing squad – exactly 
what should be done is an open question. 
Death penalty opponents say lethal 
injection's problems are just another reason 
capital punishment should be abolished 
altogether. Proponents, meanwhile, accuse 
abolitionists of using issues with the specific 
method to undermine the entire enterprise, 
which, according to the Pew Research 
Center, most Americans still support. 
Within this quagmire, death penalty experts 
fear there is a lack of political will to 
address the increasingly apparent trouble 
lethal injection is presenting state 
executioners. 
“It’s a mistake to conflate the criticisms with 
lethal injection with the death penalty 
itself,” says Deborah Denno, a Fordham 
University law school professor who has 
been studying lethal injection protocols for 
more than two decades. “Conflating the two 
has always been a problem on both sides.” 
There have been issues with lethal injection 
since it first came into use in 1982. 
According to Amherst College’s Austin 
Sarat – author of the book “Gruesome 
Spectacles: Botched Executions and 
America's Death Penalty,” which surveyed 
every U.S. execution from 1890 to 2010 – 
about 3 percent of all executions were 
botched in that period, while the error rate of 
lethal injections surveyed was about 7 
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percent. His study did not include the most 
recent spate of troublesome procedures, 
which this year included another Oklahoma 
execution as well as one in Ohio. 
Previously, "botched executions did not play 
a significant role in the overall question 
about whether we should retain capital 
punishment," Sarat says. "The context in 
which the botched executions are happening 
[now] is very different and has given them 
and will give them greater significance in 
the national debate about capital 
punishment." 
The recent surge in botched executions is 
believed to be fueled by a shortage of the 
drugs traditionally used for lethal injection. 
The last U.S. manufacturer of sodium 
thiopental stopped making the drug after 
planning to resume doing so in Italy and 
facing pressure from government authorities 
there. The European Union has restricted 
companies from exporting death penalty 
drugs to the U.S., and execution labs have 
been forced to concoct their own mix of 
drugs in-house or turn to local apothecaries 
to compound pharmaceuticals. Facing 
scrutiny over these new protocols, some 
states have passed secrecy laws, which 
authorities argue protect the identities of 
local drugmakers from harassment by anti-
death penalty activists. 
Attorneys defending death row inmates have 
used the situation to appeal executions on a 
variety of constitutional grounds, including 
freedom of information, due process, and 
cruel and unusual punishment. So far, such 
arguments have gained only limited traction 
in the courts. A three-judge panel's 
temporary stay of Wood’s execution marked 
the first appellate-level decision to side with 
the First Amendment argument that the 
inmate deserved more information from the 
state about the drugs being used to kill him. 
The Supreme Court overturned the stay, and 
the high court overall has appeared to be 
extremely reluctant to weigh in on the 
practice, having heard a lethal injection case 
only once, in 2008, when it ruled 
Kentucky’s three-drug protocol was 
constitutional. 
“It was clear the Supreme Court decision 
was a failed effort immediately,” Denno 
says, calling the Kentucky ruling – which 
came with seven separate opinions – 
“unclear, ambiguous," and one "that doesn't 
really stand for anything.” 
Even death penalty proponents recognize the 
arguments inmates’ attorneys are making 
will only gain more teeth as botched 
executions continue. 
“The more and more ugly cases, it becomes 
likely that courts are likely to intervene, but 
what that intervention looks like is a 
fascinating and uncertain question,” says 
Douglas Berman, an Ohio State University 
law school professor. 
The cost and length of time it takes to 
litigate death penalty appeals is one of the 
reasons many states have turned away from 
capital punishment altogether. While still 
legal in 32 states, only a handful conduct 
executions on a relatively regular basis. The 
delays and randomness of the California 
system – which has the largest death row in 
the country but hasn’t executed anyone since 
2006 – recently led a federal judge to 
overturn an execution sentence 
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there, declaring it cruel and unusual 
punishment. In the last decade, six states 
have formally abolished the death penalty 
(bringing the total to 18, plus the District of 
Columbia), even though in some states –
 like Connecticut – capital punishment still 
had public support when lawmakers opted to 
end it. 
The states that continue to execute people – 
including Texas, Pennsylvania and 
Tennessee, all of which have executions 
scheduled in the coming months – appear 
unwilling to let go of the practice, even as 
further questions arise.  
“Holding on to the death penalty and 
holding to the regularity of executions, 
having a source of drugs from your 
confidential source without asking many 
questions – or at least not having to answer 
many questions – that’s what's keeping these 
experimental, unpredictable, sometimes 
botched executions going lately,” says 
Richard Dieter, executive director of the 
Death Penalty Information Center. 
In the aftermath of Wood’s execution, 
conservative Arizona Gov. Jan Brewer, a 
Republican, said there would be an internal 
investigation of the execution’s length, but 
insisted the procedure was carried out “in a 
lawful manner” and that Wood “did not 
suffer." Documents released last week 
revealed that 15 doses of a drug cocktail 
were injected before Wood died, according 
to The New York Times, though authorities 
continue to deny Wood felt any pain. 
“States don’t want to admit their failures, so 
they keep plodding along,” Dieter says. 
Meanwhile, a group of news organizations is 
suing the Missouri Department of 
Corrections to reveal the sources of its lethal 
injection drugs. 
Bringing more transparency, some say, 
could help states improve their lethal 
injection methods. But even some death 
penalty proponents suggest it might be time 
to abandon lethal injection altogether. 
“There is a way the states could avoid all of 
these problems with lethal injection – that 
would be to switch to some other method,” 
says Michael Rushford, president of the pro-
capital punishment Criminal Justice Legal 
Foundation. 
Historically, every time states have switched 
to a new method of execution – like the 
movement from electrocution to lethal 
injection in the 1970s and 1980s – it's been 
due to political and legal pressures resulting 
from botched executions carried out by 
another method. 
“The hope [was] that lethal injection was the 
final frontier, the final solution to the desire 
of Americans to both having the death 
penalty and also finding a method of 
execution that was safe, reliable and 
humane. The problems with lethal injection 
go to the heart of this hope,” Sarat says. 
“There is no new technology over the 
horizon. It’s not like we can say, ‘Botched 
executions: OK, we can’t get the drugs, the 
people aren't well-trained, but we can do 
something new.’” 
Not only did 9th Circuit Chief Judge Alex 
Kozinski suggest a return to the firing squad 
or one of the other more consistent – albeit 
messier – older methods, he argued, “If we, 
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as a society, cannot stomach the splatter 
from an execution carried out by firing 
squad, then we shouldn’t be carrying out 
executions at all.”  
Kozinski has since denied that he was being 
hyperbolic, an assumption made by some 
that highlights how public perception is 
another obstacle to finding an alternative to 
lethal injection. 
“It's the biggest irony that people’s 
hypocrisy about lethal injection is one of the 
issues that is making these executions 
botched,” Denno says. “They want to have 
the so-called medical procedure because 
they can’t face the fact that they're killing 
people and the punishment that is most 
humane [firing squad] most resembles 
something that is real.” 
Another method also has been put forward: 
Rushford mentions nitrogen gas or carbon 
monoxide as "outside the box" options. But 
doubts remain whether such a change could 
truly quiet concerns people have about 
capital punishment. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“At the heart of all of this is the reality that 
the only faction that is passionate about 
reform has one particular reform in mind, 
and that would be abolition,” Berman says. 
PBS’ Gwen Ifill raised just that line of 
thought in a recent interview with Attorney 
General Eric Holder, who in turn denied that 
the Justice Department's review of recent 
protocols and problems would undercut 
capital punishment as a whole. 
“Even though I am personally opposed to 
the death penalty, as attorney general, I have 
to enforce federal law,” he said. 
 
